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THE TRUTH ABOUT HAITI
Irwin P. Stotzky'
The transition from dictatorship to democracy is a long and arduous process in
the evolution of any society. Indeed, such transitions, although crucially important
for the well-being of millions of people, are problematic at best. While the 1980s,
1990s, and the opening decade of the twenty-first century have witnessed the slow
movement from authoritarian regimes to fledgling constitutional democracies in
many nations, this process is far from complete. It remains much debated in
concept and fragile in practice.
The dramatic expansion of interest in the ideas of constitutionalism, the rule of
law, democracy, and human rights in diverse parts of the world has given rise to the
need to examine, in greater depth, the varied forms which law and institutions
designed to promote human rights and government by and for the people can take.
Moreover, this wave of democratization has brought a renewed interest in
justificatory theories and conceptions of democracy. These theories are crucial for
helping change authoritarian regimes into democratic ones. But there is a caveat to
offer. Before one can undertake this analysis, one must understand the promise and
significance of human rights to a democracy. Indeed, there is an intimate
relationship between human rights and the creation of a democracy.
In this essay, I wish to develop this relationship by looking at some of the
breathtaking difficulties, and possible solutions to them, in the movement from
authoritarianism to democracy. I do this by exploring the theoretical and practical
relationships between the economic, social, political, and legal dimensions within
the context of justificatory theories of democracy. In general, I use Haiti as the
specific example when analyzing these issues. In Part I, I introduce the Haitian
dilemma by looking at the recent devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on
January 12, 2010. In Part II, I examine the theoretical problems associated with the
concept of human rights. In Part III, I explain my conception of democracy. This
preliminary conception is developed as a justification for democracy and thus as a
basis for examining the transition process. It is also useful for suggesting changes
in the structures of these societies which, I believe, will protect human rights and
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allow people a serious opportunity to experience democracy. In Part IV, I sketch
out the significant problems of consolidating a democracy. Part V examines the
macro and micro changes that are needed for creating the conditions that will help
produce morally correct results to the seemingly insoluble problems associated
with the transition process. Part VI suggests the importance of a constitutional
adjudicative tradition to the development of a democracy. In part VII, I suggest
specific ways to encourage the Haitian people and the international community to
help Haiti recover from the devastation of the earthquake and to move towards
democracy.
Finally, in Part VIII, I discuss the international and Haitian
government response to the earthquake. If properly approached, the resolution of
these issues should strengthen the chance for the blooming of democratic regimes
in Haiti and even worldwide.
I. THE EARTHQUAKE
The earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, a little more than nine
months ago, left at least 230,000 dead2 and perhaps more than 300,000 dead. An
estimated two million people were left homeless in Port-au-Prince alone, and it is
likely that anywhere from 300,0004 to 600,000s have already left the city seeking
shelter with family in the countryside. Roughly 250,000 to 500,000 were injured,
almost half of which are likely to be children, according to a pediatric emergency
study.6 Hospitals in Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties in Florida
have provided for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of earthquake victims and the
federal government has activated the National Disaster Medical system to cover
some of the victims' medical costs.7 The United States has led the world in its
response to the Haitian tragedy, but not necessarily in as humane a manner as
suggested by the national and local media.
The earthquake was a catastrophic magnitude 7.3 earthquake. Its epicenter
was near the town of L6ogine, approximately 17 kilometers (10.56 miles)
southwest of Port-au-Prince. 9 An estimated three million people were affected by

2.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS., 111TH CONG., HAITI AT A CROSSROADS, S.
Rep. No. 111-51, at 1 (2010); U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Haiti - Earthquake, USAID.GOV,
http://www.usaid.gov/ourwork/humanitarian-assistance/disasterassistance/countries/haiti/template/fs
sr/fy2010/haiti eq_fs58_06-11-2010.pdf (last visited July 18, 2010).
3.
Estimates vary, compare STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS., supra note 2, at 1;
U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., supra note 2, with GOV'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, ACTION PLAN FOR
NATIONAL RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI 7 (2010).
4.
U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., supranote 2.
5.
Gov'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supranote 3, at 7.
6.
Science Daily, Almost Half of Injured Haitians Are Likely to Be Children, Pediatric
Emergency Study Indicates, sciencedaily.com, Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/20
10/01/100127085542.htm (last visited July 18, 2010).
7.
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human. Services, National DisasterMedical System Helping US.
Hospitals Treat Survivors of Earthquake in Haiti, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/haiti/ndms-ushospit
als.html (last visited July 18, 2010).
8.
GOV'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supra note 3, at 6.
9.
Id.
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the quake.' 0 Approximately 30,000 commercial buildings, 208,000 residences,
1,300 educational institutions, and more than 50 hospitals and health centers have
collapsed or were seriously damaged." The earthquake damaged or destroyed
many notable landmark buildings, including the Presidential Palace, the National
Assembly building, the Port-au-Prince Cathedral, and the National Penitentiary.' 2
Among those killed were Archbishop of Port-au-Prince, Joseph Serge Miot,' 3 and
opposition leader Micha Gaillard.14 The headquarters of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), located in Port-au-Prince, collapsed,
killing many people including the mission chief, Hddi Annabi.15
Many countries responded to appeals for humanitarian aid, pledging funds and
dispatching rescue and medical teams, engineers, and support personnel. For
example, even the small nation of Israel sent a medical team which arrived almost
immediately after the earthquake struck and set up a field hospital.' 6
Communication systems, air, land, and sea transport facilities, hospital and
electrical networks, minimal at best before the earthquake, have been severely
damaged or completely destroyed by the earthquake. These problems, of course,
hampered rescue and aid efforts. The United States military took charge of the
airport, treating the operation as a military mission. This both helped and hampered
rescue efforts.' 7 For example, confusion over who was in charge, air traffic
congestion, and problems with prioritization of flights further complicated early
relief work. Port-au-Prince morgues were overwhelmed. Tens of thousands were
buried in mass graves. As rescues diminished, supplies, medical care, and
sanitation became priorities. Delays in aid distribution led to angry appeals from
aid workers and survivors.
International aid is essential to any kind of positive recovery, but reliance on
the Haitian people is even more essential. But the Haitian government appears not
to be up to the task. For example, that government called off search efforts very

10.
U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., supranote 2.
11.
Gov'T OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supranote 3, at 7.
12.
U.N.
News
Centre,
Haiti
Earthquake
Situation:
Situation
Updates,
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/haitiquake update.shtml (last visited July 18, 2010); Gov'T
OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, supra note 3, at 7; Deborah Sontag, Amid the Rubble, Seeking a Refuge in
Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at 1-2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/18/world/ame
ricas/18church.html.
13.
Charles Forelle, Archbishop Joseph Serge Miot, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704423204575018131856209128.html.
14.
Jos6 de C6rdoba, Micha Gaillard,Fought For Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2010,
availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052748703822404575019190559786092.html.
Joe Lauria, Hidi Annabi, U.N. Diplomat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2010, available at
15.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052748704423204575018140345867322.html.
16.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Aid to Haiti, FieldHospitalSet Up, Jan. 28, 2010,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Israel+beyond+politics/IsraeliaidarrivesHaiti17-Jan-2010.htm.
17.
See Charles Bremner, FrancesBridles at US Haiti Take-Over, THE TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010,
available at http://timescorrespondents.typepad.com/charles-bremner/2010/01/it-did-not-take-long-forfr-ance-to-start-bickering-with-the-united-states-over-haiti-the-american-take-over-of-the-relie.btml;

Philippe Naughton, US Troops Take Over Palaceas Haiti Aid Effort Steps up a Gear, THE TIMES, Jan.
19, 2010, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tolnews/world/usandamericas/article6994
013.ece.

4

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTL LAW

[Vol. 26:1

early-on Friday, January 22, 2010. 18 On January 29, 2010, the United Nations
9
noted that the emergency phase of the relief operation was drawing to a close.'
President Obama announced that former Presidents Bill Clinton, who also acts
as the United Nations special envoy to Haiti, and George W. Bush would
coordinate efforts to raise funds for Haiti's recovery.20 On June 22, 2010, the U.S.
Senate passed the Kerry-Corker Haiti Empowerment, Assistance, and Relief Act of
2010 which authorizes the distribution of two billion dollars to Haiti in the next
two years.21 President Obama pledged that the people of Haiti "will not be
forgotten." 22
Josseline Colimon Fetherie, the Haitian Trade and Industry Minister, estimated
that the earthquake's toll on the Haitian economy would be massive, with one in
five jobs lost. 23 In response to the earthquake, foreign governments offered badly
needed financial aid. The European Union promised £420 million Euros (U.S. $593
million) for emergency and long-term aid.24 Brazil announced $172 million for
long-term recovery aid.25 The United Kingdom Secretary of State for International
Development, Douglas Alexander, called the result of the earthquake an "almost
unprecedented level of devastation," and committed the United Kingdom to 20
million pounds (U.S. $32.7 million) in aid,26 while France promised £10 million
Euros (U.S. $14.4 million).27 Italy announced it would waive prepayment of the
£40 million Euros (U.S. $55.7 million) it had loaned to Haiti,28 and the World Bank
waved the country's debt repayments for five years.29 In a startling announcement,
Venezuela promised $1.32 billion.30
18. Robin Henry, Haiti Calls Off Searchfor Survivors As Effort Turns to Aid, THE TIMES, Jan. 23,
2010, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us-andamericas/article6999640.ece.
Moreover, more than nine months after the earthquake struck the situation remains dire. Indeed, the
cleanup of the rubble has hardly started.
19. United Nations, Press Conference on Haiti by UnitedNations Emergency Relief Coordinator,
Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2010/100129_Holmes.doc.htm.
20.
See Steve Holland, Obama Enlists Bush, Clinton to Help Haiti, REUTERS, Jan. 14, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60D5JO20100115.
21.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at v.
Helene Cooper, Obama Pledges Aid to Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at A13, available
22.
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/us/15prexy.html?-r-1.
U.S. General Services Administration, MARKETIPS, 23 U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN. 16
23.
(May/June 2010), availableat https://apps.fas.gsa.gov/ (search "marketips") (last visited July 18, 2010).
Haiti Quake Response Exposes EU Frailties, EU BUSINESS (Jan. 20, 2010, 2:47 PM),
24.
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/haiti-quake.2cw (last visited July 18, 2010).
25.
Countries Pledge Billions Towards Haiti's Recovery NPR (Apr. 1, 2010) transcript
availableat http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=125441585&sc=emaf.
Trenton Daniel et al., More Troops, HumanitarianAid Coming to Haiti;Mass Migration to
26.
U.S. Not Materializing, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 18, 2010, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/20
10/01/18/1431558 3 3/window-closing-for-survivors-relief.html.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
PNoWB Int'l Secretariat, InternationalFinancialInstitutions Increase Support to Haiti in
29.
Aftermath of Earthquake (Feb. 3, 2010) availableat http://www.pnowb.org/admindb/docs/Haiti%20up
date%2003FEBl0.pdf.
Joe Johns & MaryAnne Fox, Most Countries Fail to Deliver on Haiti Aid Pledges, CNN
30.
(July 15, 2010, 2:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/anericas/07/15/haiti.donatio
ns/index.html?iref-allsearch.
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But the aid has been slow in coming. Indeed, as this article goes to press, nine
months after the earthquake struck, most of the promised aid has not been
received. 3 ' Refugee International, a refugee-advocacy group, released a report
stating that "the people of Haiti are still living in a state of emergency, with a
humanitarian response that appears paralyzed."32 The United States has been
among the donor nations that have been sharply criticized for its slow response in
providing promised aid.33 Former President Bill Clinton, who serves as co-chair of
the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, stated that eighteen recovery projects,
which would aid more than a million Haitians, have been approved but are
underfunded.34 The 'funding gaps', as the former president calls them, demonstrate
the "ongoing problem of trying to get donor nations to fulfill their pledges." 35
Canada has been especially diligent and generous in its promise to aid Haiti.
The Government of Canada announced it would match the donations of Canadians
up to a total of CAD$50 million. After a United Nations call for help for the
people affected by the earthquake, Canada pledged an additional CAD$60 million
(U.S. $58 million) in aid, bringing Canada's total contribution to CA D$135 million
(U.S. $131.5 million).31 However, Canada's efforts are not without its criticisms.
As of August 2010, Canada has provided only a small fraction of the pledged aid.38
Additionally, some of the promised aid has been spent on Canada's military
operation.39 Critics of Canada report that the military did not provide security and
stability or medical aid to the civilian population, as was the goal of the mission.
Instead, the warships were "loaded mainly with soldiers and guns". 4 1 The naval
mission reportedly stayed for only five weeks and departed in a "disruptive and

31.
Jonathan M. Katz & Martha Mendoza, Haiti Still Waitingfor Pledged US Aid, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/29/world/main6909940.shtml (the money is
said to be tied up due to bureaucracy, disorganization, and a lack of urgency. "One Senator has held up a
key authorization bill because of a five million dollar provision he says will be wasteful.").
32.
Larry Freund, UN Urges IncreasedProtectionfor HaitianRefugees, VOANEW.COM (Oct.
7, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/americas/UN-Urges-Increased-Protection-for-HaitianRefugees-104521294.html.
33.
Jacqueline Charles, U.S. to provide $120M to Haiti, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/10/07/1861168/us-to-provide-120m-to-haiti.html.
However,
in
response to criticism, the United States has approved $120 million in aid that will be allocated for
"education, rubble removal, and housing in earthquake shattered Haiti." Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Ottawa Matching Canadians' Haiti Donations, CBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/01/14/haiti-canada-aid.html.
37.
Agence France-Presse, Canada Pledges 60 Million Canadian Dollars for Haiti Aid,
GOOGLE
NEWS
(Jan.
19,
2010),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afplarticle/ALeqM5h2lptHeJr8BF8LMxPPiqfrMla3Qg.
38.
Roger Annis, Canada'sFailedAid to Haiti, CAN. HAITI ACTION NETWORK (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/content/canadas-failed-aid-haiti.
39.
Id.
40.
Roger Annis, Exaggerated Claims: Assessing the Canadian Military's Earthquake
Response, HAITIANALYSIS.COM (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.haitianalysis.com/2010/10/7/exaggeratedclaims-assessing-the-canadian-military-s-earthquake-response.
41.
Id.
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destructive fashion" taking much of the equipment that was needed to remove
rubble.42
Unfortunately, the destruction caused by the earthquake is only one of the
problems confronting Haiti's attempt to make the transition from authoritarianism
to democracy-from "misery to poverty with dignity." Indeed, many of the
problems facing Haiti, while highlighted and exacerbated by the destruction caused
by the earthquake, however, are not caused by natural disasters. They are manmade ones. In addition, and unfortunately, it is now clear that the United States-led
relief effort has conformed to the three fundamental tendencies that have shaped
Haiti's history and crippled its development as a democracy. It has adopted military
priorities and strategies. It has sidelined-indeed severely minimized-Haiti's own
leaders and government, and even ignored the needs of a majority of its people.
And it has proceeded in ways that reinforce the already harrowing gap between the
rich and poor by ignoring the role the Haitian people can play in their own
development. All three tendencies are not simply connected, they are mutually
reinforcing. These same tendencies will continue to govern the imminent
reconstruction effort as well, unless determined political and social action is taken
to counteract them.
Thus it is clear that Haiti is more than a natural tragedy. The Haiti case is
suggestive for other significant reasons. It teaches important lessons about the
difficulties of the transition process and the creation and stabilization of a
democratic nation. It teaches lessons about the importance of law to the creation
and sustainability of a democracy. It demonstrates that if the relevant political
actors, both domestic and international, are to be successful in helping to create the
conditions for democracy to bloom, they must be highly educated and thoughtful
on a number of significant issues. They must be intimately familiar with, and
understand the history and culture of a nation. They must understand the major
problems and complexities inherent in the transition from dictatorship to
democracy. And they must have a clear vision of the justificatory theories for
democracy. To put it another way, the creative experiments necessary to transform
a society will not take place without such knowledge, and the international
community's effort to help nations overcome their authoritarian legacies will
simply fail. Unfortunately, the international community's recent efforts in Haiti
since 1994 illustrate this failure.
The original intervention by the international community in 1994 to return
Aristide and its approach to Haiti have been successful in a very limited way, but
the long term prognosis for creating the conditions for democracy to flower has
been shattered by events since that intervention. The international community was
successful in restoring the Aristide government to power, and political power was
transferred from one duly elected government to another-from Aristide to Prdval,
from Prival back to Aristide, and from Aristide back to Prival.43 This adds up to a
42.
Id.
Between 2004 and 2006 a puppet government put in by the United States, with support from
43.
France and Canada, governed Haiti. This led, once again, to the deaths of several thousand Haitians.
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total of four democratically elected governments since 1990. The Haitian Army
was abolished and a new and at first relatively well-trained police force was created
which, for all its limitations, functioned reasonably well for a short period under
extremely difficult conditions." Today the nation is in disorder. Political violence,
criminal violence, and human rights violations are once again a serious problem.
Abject poverty, disease, and unemployment, among other serious problems, persist.
Life for the vast majority of Haitians remains frightening.
In spite of their problems, Haitians do not expect or want a return to
dictatorship, however benign. When one looks to the future, it is clear that
democratization remains at an embryonic stage. The democratization process has
been reversed. In point of fact, since 2004, Haiti has clearly been sliding in the
wrong direction.
It is relatively clear that the international community, particularly the United
States, dramatically underestimated the Haitian challenge. After the success of the
1994 military intervention, the international community did not have a well
thought-out plan linked to the publicly stated reasons for the intervention-to
restore democracy 45 -that would have given the Haitian people a fighting chance
to challenge successfully some of those almost unresolveable problems.46 The
international community simply assumed that economic and political development,
and social harmony, would be relatively easy to achieve. This was a dangerous
illusion. In fact, there appears to be an inverse relationship between these factors.
The very weaknesses of Haitian institutions and modes of operation, which made
the military engagement so easy and successful, make the economic, political, and
social challenges so difficult. The debility of Haitian institutions and their
operations provided no strong basis for resisting a military invasion; neither did
they, or the culture that had emaciated them, provide a foundation for democratic,
political, or economic development. The society lacks a cohesive national identity
and any sense of collective purpose.
Therefore, before political actors can judge whether humanitarian intervention
in the guise of military force and the occupation of a country is justified, they need
to have a clear understanding of the goals of intervention and whether they are
justifiable. Simply because the action may be "legal" does not, of course,
necessarily make it morally justifiable. These political actors also need to
understand the problems associated with any transition to democracy and to be
imaginative in trying to resolve those problems, working within the history and
culture of that particular nation. Transformation requires knowledge, theory, and
the courage to take steps necessary for positive reform.
44.
See Carol J. Williams, Haiti Debates Having a Homegrown Army, L.A. TIMES, July 30,
2007, at A8. The United Nations trained the police force, and appointed at that time former, and today
current, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly to head the training group. See Ron
Howell, Offer To Train Rookies in Native Land, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 8, 2004, at A23. Mr. Kelly is
the first person to hold the post for two non-consecutive tenures.
45.
The publicly stated reasons should have been not to restore, but to create a democracy!
This is the point at which theory becomes important. Contrary to most people who favor
46.
democracy, I believe that justificatory theories of democracy are essential for creating solutions to the
problems confronting a nation which is attempting to move from dictatorship to democracy.
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RIGHTS

Before addressing some of these other issues, one must understand the
importance of human rights to the creation of a democracy. The recognition and
protection of human rights is perhaps the most significant aspect of social life in a
democratic society. Indeed, human rights constitute an indispensable instrument
that governments employ to avoid social catastrophes that often threaten the lives
of large numbers of people. This is, of course, especially important in the transition
from authoritarianism to democracy, precisely because the transition is such a long
and arduous journey.
Yet several prominent problems in any such transition must be successfully
resolved if the transition is to succeed without great harm to masses of people.
Institutional structures must be developed and secured. Economic and political
stability must be assured. Corporatist social and political structures must be
transformed so that the powerless get their fair shares of the necessities of life. The
rule of law 47 must become paramount in the formal institutions and practices of
government, and in the affairs of daily life. The transition process is, however,
quite fragile, and the wrong choices by public officials on the many complicated
issues that confront them can prove fatal to a democracy and thus lead to serious
deprivations of human rights.
The problem is even more complicated than it first appears. One of the major
factors that weaken the quest to promote human rights is the perception that once
legally recognized, they are forever secured. Although such recognition is
important because it makes it possible to block certain kinds of human rights
violations carried out by the state, it is not enough. It is insufficient because those
who have a monopoly on coercion may employ the state machinery to carry out the
most brutal and devastating violations of rights. Legal recognition of rights simply
does not ensure their practical enforcement when the state engages in these acts.
International covenants, while helpful, also have their limits. The ideological
divergence among governing powers in different nations leads to recognition of
only a limited set of undisputed rights. In addition, notions of sovereignty restrict
acceptance of international obligations, including outside intervention in aid of the
investigation and punishment of human rights violations. The failure of legal
recognition to protect fully human rights is connected to another barrier to their
continued viability-naked interests. These naked interests, however, are often
47.
The rule of law is a call to political justice and has remained, over the centuries, a vibrant
ideal of democratic society. The central core of the principle embodies the enduring values of regularity
and restraint - of treating like cases alike and inhibiting the arbitrary actions of government officials.
These thoughts are traditionally captured in the slogan of "a government of laws, not men." When I
refer to the rule of law, I also mean to refer to the Constitution of a nation, the document which creates
and embodies the public morality of that particular nation. The rule of law includes both the words of
the Constitution and its animating principles - those that are necessarily "inferred from the overall
structure of the Constitution." Owen Fiss, The Fragility of Law, 54 YALE L. REP. 40 (2007). In
addition, it includes specific congressional or parliamentary enactments that articulate the governing
principles of any particular society. "These principles are laden with a special normative value that
derives from the role they play in defining [the] national identity" of a country - what it means to be a
member of a specific nation-state. Id.
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concealed behind a mask of ideology. Moreover, attacks on human rights often
come from true believers of ideologies contemptuous of these rights.
If legal recognition does not ensure promotion or protection of rights, what
additional approaches exist? I believe that one must look beyond the legal
recognition of human rights to the creation of a moral consciousness of humanity
which recognizes the value of those rights and abhors any action that disregards
them. Moreover, such a consciousness, if fully rooted, constitutes the most
permanent and efficacious barrier against the enemies of human dignity. But how
can a moral consciousness of humanity be achieved? The possible answers:
through rational discussion or propaganda. However, the latter is insufficient
because it conditions the mind to a kind of answer which may well adapt itself to
the opposite stimulus and because it implies an elitist attitude which is
pragmatically inconsistent with the defense of the rights promoted by the
propaganda.
Rational discourse, on the other hand, encompasses a broader range of interests
than that of human rights. Almost every human being, even a tyrant, feels obligated
to justify his acts. That attempt at justification, even if extremely hypocritical and
unsophisticated, may lead to illuminating analysis. The issue runs even deeper. The
very proponents of human rights often attempt to avoid the moral discussion
necessary to justify these rights. However, it is clear that the commitment is a
moral one and, if it is not justified on the basis of reasons, one remains defenseless
before those who reject it. Finally, it is also necessary to determine both what rights
must be recognized and their scope. It, therefore, seems obvious that the best
political system for creating a moral consciousness in people is a democratic one.
But what kind of a democracy?
III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Before recognizing the relationship of human rights to democratic
development, one needs to examine the moral justifications for democracy.48 Most
political actors involved in the process of consolidating democratic regimes find
conceptions of democracy and all they entail only relevant from the perspective of
subjective legitimacy. (from the perspective of the functionality of the political
system.) Subjective legitimacy is the generalized belief of the population in the
moral justifiability of the government and its directives. Democracy is therefore
seen as an instrument to the end goal of stability. In effect, those engaged in
democratic transition and propose institutional reforms are attempting to create,
consolidate, and stabilize democratic structures while averting threats of reversal to
authoritarian alternatives. These political actors and scholars are clearly firm
partisans of democracy and take it for granted that it is the best political system.
They do not, however, consider that what makes democracy the best political
For a thorough discussion and analysis of theories of democracy and suggested policies
48.
derived from some of these theories, see generally IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNs INHAITI:
THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 62-75 (1997).
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system is relevant to ascertaining the means for its creation and preservation.
Instead, they typically adopt a perspective characterized by a results-oriented
process, concluding that whatever is responsible for making democracy the morally
best system of government can be identified by certain factual features-regular
ways in which citizens may affect a change of government, the division of power,
or respect for basic rights. Simply by identifying and replicating the phenomenon
or desired results, using a system in force in some paradigmatic country, such as
the United States, Britain or France, these actors seek, in a value-neutral way, the
proper means for achieving or preserving that system.
This method is mistaken; indeed, it is deeply flawed. Democracy is a
normative concept and cannot be identified in depth without articulating fully the
evaluative conception that justifies its distinctive institutions. The inevitability of
this normative inquiry is demonstrated by the inherent conflicts and tensions within
the distinctive institution of democracy, making it impossible simply to identify
and adopt appropriate democratic institutions. Any number of questions can be
raised to prove this point. Is democracy the phenomenon of representation (the
weakest form of democracy), or is a system of representation merely an auxiliary
institution imposed by the difficulties of direct democracy in an open society? Is it
the separation of the executive and the legislative powers, or is it instead an optimal
arrangement that is not adopted in parliamentary democracies without the loss of
value? Is it the recognition of a bill of rights as limits to majoritarian decisions
imposed by independent judicial institutions? Are political parties distinctive
democratic institutions, or are they unnecessary in a better working, well
functioning democracy? Is the proportional representative system the best method
of democratic representation, or is it only one of many diverse alternatives that
must be chosen for technical reasons?
When we come to realize the full range of these issues, it is clear that there are
no distinctive institutions of democracy outside of a value-laden theory that simply
justifies a set of options. We cannot identify institutions commonly understood as
democratic and work out a method for stabilizing them without systematically
analyzing the moral theory that justifies them. Reality does not tell us which
institutions are essential and which are contingent in relation to a normative
concept like that of democracy. We are unable to determine what contingencies we
can manipulate to preserve the essentials of the concept. The "realist" who thinks
otherwise is mistaken, even substantially confused.
While this is not the place to discuss fully theories of democracy and their
justifications, it is clear that the best means for countering some of the difficulties
of moving from dictatorship to democracy is to create a polity governed by
universal and impersonal principles where individual citizens, who are not
identified with any particular interests but preserve the capacity of adopting
different ones, make choices in a process of public justification and dialogue. This
requires broad popular participation in governmental decision making and its
consequent actions, led by strong participative and ideologically committed
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political parties and parliamentary bodies. These parties and parliaments must
themselves, of course, be internally democratic, open, and disciplined.
These conclusions are based on an epistemic view of democracy and upon the
utmost respect for the autonomy of each individual. In this view, autonomy consists
of the exercise of self-governing capacities, such as the capacities of understanding,
imagining, reasoning, valuing, and desiring. Free persons have, and are recognized
as having, such capacities. In a political order dedicated to serving the conditions of
free deliberation for its members, those members can legitimately expect of that
order that it not only permit, but also encourage the exercise of such capacitiesthat it permit and encourage autonomy. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of liberal
democracy is the notion of the citizen who is not identified with any interest, but is
free to choose and has an equal voice in expressing his choice.
This ideal of the autonomous individual as a paradigm for democracy rejects
the view that democracy is simply a conglomeration of interested individuals and
groups working in conjunction with the economy or merely a mechanism for
50
replacing elites. 149 and many others, most prominently Carlos S. Nino, have
elsewhere attempted to explain democracy as a regimented mode of the practice of
moral discourse by which we try to solve conflicts in the light of universal, general
and public principles that would be accepted in ideal conditions of impartiality,
rationality and knowledge. This, the argument goes, makes democracy morally
superior to other systems of government. Democracy substitutes simple
majoritarian decision for the requirement of a unanimous consensus in the common
and non-regimented practice of moral discourse. But this is not completely
sufficient. This substitution weakens the force of the prescription that the result of
the procedure is morally valid because it would be accepted under ideal conditions
(given the functional equivalence between unanimity and impartiality).
Nevertheless, democracy preserves some epistemological value because the need to
justify one's decision to others in order to gain their support generates a tendency
toward impartiality. This impartiality, in turn, makes it more reliable than other
decision processes, such as individual reflection.
This epistemic view of democracy presupposes that individuals, who are
basically moral persons, are its natural agents and that the freedom and equality of
their intervention in the democratic process should be preserved and expanded.
This is not the case when corporations control the polity and assume the role of
intermediaries. 5' Moreover, this conception of democracy as a substitute for moral
discourse presupposes that the primary objects of decision in the democratic
process are not crude interests but principles that legitimize a certain balance of
interests from an impartial point of view. While it is possible that discourse may
have its genesis in crude interests, for those interests to garner majority agreement,
See generally STOTZKY, supra note 48; Irwin P. Stotzky, Creating the Conditions for
49.
Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 157 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C.
Slye eds., 1999).
See, e.g., CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, ETICA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS: UN ENSAYO DE
50.
FUNDAMENTACION (1984). Nino was the main proponent of this epistemic view of democracy.
Unfortunately, this is often the case in authoritarian regimes.
51.
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advocates must win support and justify their positions. Thus, the dialogue requires
participants to reach for principles beyond their crude interests. They must reach
for principles from an impartial point of view. In addition, dialogue respects and
fosters autonomy. Again, this is not the case when corporations control the polity
and assume the role of intermediaries. It follows, therefore, that corporations,
which agglutinate people around common interests and not around moral views
about how to deal with common interests, cannot be the protagonists of the
democratic process.
Corporative entities in transitional societies maintain and even increase their
power whenever democracy departs substantially from the strictures of the original
practice of moral discourse. When this occurs, public debate becomes restricted
and debased, the power of participants actually to influence people becomes
grossly unequal, and the participation of interested people becomes narrower and
weaker. Thus, in order to strengthen the democratic power of common citizens
against that of corporations, it is crucial to broaden and deepen popular
participation in political discussion and decision-making.
Furthermore, the mechanisms of representation, necessary in large and
complex societies, are prone to be subverted by corporative power. This
subversion can be caused by several factors. There is the possibility of corruption
of the individual representatives, their indifference or even antipathy toward the
people they represent when corporations oppose the people's positions, and the
apathy of the people represented. For these reasons, it is essential to widen the
ways of direct participation by the people whose interests are at issue. This is, of
course, a difficult task. Nevertheless, it is possible to do this through general
procedures like referenda, popular consultation or through decentralized decisions
that allow the concerned people to participate directly. 52
Moreover, the vision of democracy as a regimented modality of discussion of
moral principles to regulate conflicts allows us to qualify the liberal rejection of
any intermediary between the individual and the state. Indeed, in a large, complex
society, some institutions must protect the individual against the awesome power of
corporatism. The most likely candidates are political parties, but only when those
parties are the standard for or represent the basis of fundamental principles of
political morality. They are indispensable in a modem and large society, not only
because they nurture those principles in professional politicians who purport to put
them into practice if duly elected, but also because they exempt individuals from
justifying their votes before each other on the basis of principles. In this view, it is
sufficient to vote for a party that organizes its programs on the basis of public,
general and impartial principles.
The deterioration of the role of political parties in favor of corporations occurs
when the importance of parliament, the national arena for these parties, is severely
eroded. Unfortunately, the integrity of parliament is often diminished by
corporative forces in the transition and consolidation processes. Corporations prefer

52.

Courts, of course, may play a central role here.
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to exert pressures and achieve agreements in the private offices of the
administration rather than in the noisy, pluralistic, and more public parliamentary
corridors. In addition, administrations tend to preserve some of the practices
inherited from previous authoritarian governments. Strengthening political parties
and the parliamentary institutions in order to protect the democratic system against
corporative power, however, will work only to the extent that these institutions do
not become transformed into corporations themselves. Unfortunately, this
corporative transformation occurs often, particularly when parties weaken their
ideological commitment, fail to promote debates on essential questions of public
morality, block channels of participation, operate through methods of patronage
and clientelism, or resort to personalism and caudillism. If this happens, these
parties and parliaments tend to develop elites with distinctive interests who are
likely to become aligned with members of traditional corporative groups in a
manner inimical to democratic principles. This also causes other dangerous
distortions. When parties become corporations, parliament becomes weakened by
the lack of diverse views held by different representatives, by a discourse that is
both ideologically vacuous and detached from the experiences and interests of the
people represented, and by a general appearance of opacity and self-service.
To alleviate or even avoid this danger, political parties and parliament must be
fortified. This can be achieved by opening the parties to broad popular
participation, promoting permanent political debates within them, perfecting
internal democratic mechanisms for selecting party leaders and candidates, and
giving a public accounting of the reasons for significant actions, such as how funds
are to be managed. It is also important that the electoral system combine the need
for promoting party cohesion and ideological identity with the need for the voter to
identify with individual representatives, rather than simply voting for the party
slate. A mixed electoral system incorporating proportional representation with
individual candidate selection may satisfy both needs. This concept can be
extended to parliamentary procedures, which should combine party discipline with
a degree of autonomy for individual representatives."
From this limited discussion of democracy, it is apparent that the international
community lacked a valid normative conception of democracy when it intervened
in Haiti and failed to create the proper incentives in Haiti to help democracy grow.
Moreover, if the international community, lead by the United States, did have a
coherent normative conception of democracy, it seems to have misunderstood how
to apply it-to create the conditions for a constitutional democracy to grow-to its
actions in Haiti.
An additional serious problem afflicts the international effort in Haiti and
exacerbates the failure to understand the significance of normative justifications for
democracy. There seems to be a misunderstanding, even an ignorance, of the
From this discussion, it is clear that courts have an important, if somewhat limited role to
53.
play in checking the executive and helping to stabilize and consolidate institutional structures that
champion individual participation and democracy. Again, however, that role depends on particular
visions and versions of democracy and on the particular historical and cultural aspects of any particular
nation.
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problems associated with the transition and consolidation process.54 But before one
can judge the potential for a successful transition from dictatorship to democracy in
any nation undergoing this difficult process, one must understand the problems
associated with it. To put it another way, this process presents difficult problems of
its own that must be understood before one can create policies favorable to the
creation of a democracy.
But there is a further complication. The problems of the transition process and
possible solutions to them, in turn, cannot be successfully addressed without a valid
justificatory theory of democracy. Theory and practice go hand in hand. As a base
line, such a democratic vision requires a continuous order of mutually assured and
encouraged autonomy in which political decisions are manifestly based on the
judgments of members of that society who are perceived and treated as free and
equal persons. The expression of self-governing capacities must operate both
within the formal institutions of politics and in the affairs of daily life. The
democratic order must satisfy the conditions of equal freedom and autonomy that
give it definition.
IV. MAJOR TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS

What are some of the issues associated with the creation and consolidation of a
democracy? There are several significant features of the consolidation of
democracies that have taken place in Latin America and Haiti. The first significant
feature of the consolidation is the fact that the process of democratization has taken
place in many of these nations during some of the worst economic, social, and
political crises in the history of these nations. In general, these crises include the
commission of massive human rights violations (murder, rape, and torture),
enormous debts, hyperinflation, epidemics, natural disasters, dramatic and
surprising increases in already high rates of infant mortality, extremely high rates
of unemployment, and the collapse of entire systems of social welfare.
Haiti presents an uncomfortably extreme example of many of these problems.
There, the human and material resources are in such short supply, or have been
degraded by such severe poverty (even destitution), illiteracy, malnutrition, disease,
violence, corruption, overpopulation, rapid urbanization, deforestation, and soil
erosion, as to raise serious questions about Haiti's continued survival as a society
and as an independent nation-state.
Even before the crisis erupted, between 1991 and 1994, over the military's
refusal to restore President Aristide to power, Haiti was the poorest country in the
54.

For an analysis of different characterizations of the process of transition, see generally THE

BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1978); TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 4th prtg. 1993).

55.
Argentina during the reign of terror, between 1976 and 1983, is the prime example of some
of these problems. See Jefferson Morley, Argentina's Trial, Latin Tribulations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1985, at A27. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS, NEVER AGAIN
(Writers and Scholars Int'l trans., 1986), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20031004074316/nun
camas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm.
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Western Hemisphere. 6 Its per-capita income was $370 a year. At that time, in a
country of approximately seven million people, there were fewer than a thousand
doctors.5 8 The life expectancy was a mere fifty-six years, one in every eight babies
died before reaching the age of one, and seventy percent of all children were
estimated to suffer from some form of malnutrition.59 At least two-thirds of the
population was illiterate, and the state school system was so inefficient and small
that fewer than five percent of eligible students were enrolled in government high
schools.6 0 As if these problems are not bad enough in themselves, many of the
doctors, engineers, administrators, and others with the necessary skills to change
Haiti have been killed or driven into exile.6 1 Most of those who are in exile do not
wish to risk their lives and fortunes by returning to Haiti until positive changes
occur.62 The irony is that Haiti needs these very same people to make the changes
that would attract them to return. Unfortunately, these conditions have not
improved since the "restoration of democracy." It is clear that many of these
conditions have become even more serious since the international military
interventions of 1994 and 2004.
56.
HaitiansResigned to Sanctions,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), June 24, 1993, at 10A.
57.
John Kifner, Mission to Haiti: The Overview; Haitians Rejoice as American MP.'s Visit
PolicePosts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al.
58.
Larry Rohter, HaitiIs a Land Without a Country, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, at E3.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. The state of education, a major key to development, is one of the main reasons that Haiti
remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The teachers remain wholly inadequate to the task of
educating the millions of those desiring to improve their lives. For example, in December 1996 and
January 1997, Haiti's approximately twelve hundred grade school teachers took a simple test, and
almost all of them failed it. Only four hundred could alphabetize a list of words; only forty-one could
arrange fractions by size. This ignorance is reflected in the students. More than half of the children
between six and twelve cannot read. In addition, classrooms are extremely overcrowded - some have
more than two hundred students - and most classrooms do not have benches, chalkboards, or even doors.
See Michael Norton, Teacher Strike Highlights Education Crisis in Haiti; They Want Better Training and Their Pay,MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 1997, at 8A.
61.
Indeed, there are sizable populations of exiled Haitians in New York, Montreal, Paris, and
Miami.
62.
See Interview with Cathy Maternowska, Anthropologist (Nov. 8, 1993 - Aug. 1, 1995);
Interview with Jean-Jean Pierre, Journalist (1994-1995); Interview with Leon-Francois Hoffman,
Professor and expert on Haitian culture, Princeton Univ., Dept. of Romance Languages and Literatures,
(Jan. 1993 - Aug. 2010). Most of the information about these issues and the state of civil society has
been gleaned from extensive continuing interviews, from 1987 to 2010, with Cathy Maternowska,
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and Jean-Jean Pierre, from extensive discussions with Leon-Francois
Hoffman, and through the writings of all of these people and others, particularly Michel-Rolph
Trouillot, too numerous to list.
63.
For example, in 2004, according to estimates by the World Bank, Haiti's gross national
income (GNI) measured at 2002-2004 prices was equivalent to $390 per head or $1,680 per head on an
international purchasing-power parity basis. I THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 2058 (47th ed. 2006).
"In 1995-2004 the population increased at an average annual rate of 2.0%, while gross domestic product
(GDP) per head decreased, in real terms, by an average of 1.2% per year." Id. During this time period
(1995-2004), "Haiti's overall GDP decreased, in real terms, at an average annual rate of 0.8%." Id. In
2003-2004, real GDP decreased by 3.8%. Id. In 1997, primary school enrollment "included only 19.4%
of children in the relevant age-group (18.9% of boys; 19.9% of girls)." Id at 2059. In 1997, secondary
school enrollment included only 34.2% of children in the relevant age-group (35.2% of boys; 33.2% of
girls). Id. "In 1999 combined enrollment in primary, secondary and tertiary education was 52%." Id. In
addition, children in Haiti are more likely to die during early childhood than in any other country in the
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The most difficult obstacles to democracy in many countries, particularly in
Haiti, however, may be psychological and cultural. For example, the tradition of a
predatory, oppressive state has left Haitians deeply distrustful of government and of
foreigners. Haiti's political culture has long been characterized as an admiration of
force. Political disputes are often settled not by negotiation, but through the
exercise of force, and respect for democratic procedures and obligations, including
reasoned justifications for actions, are minimal.
Furthermore, there is great controversy in the international community about
whether the problems associated with these transitions and the attempts to address
them are leading to a change in the economic and social structures of these
countries necessary to allow for a new oligopolization of the economy." To put it
another way, it remains unclear whether a new oligopolization will develop which
will greatly restrict the avenues of access for the powerless sectors of society to the
basic goods necessary for leading a life of dignity, or whether, on the contrary, the
crisis is leading to more efficient schemes of production, thereby benefiting all
sectors of society. In Haiti, the unequal distribution of resources, and thus the
general living conditions, has become even more disparate since the international
military intervention. The elites have obtained an even larger share of the wealth
than they possessed before the intervention, and everyone else (more than ninety
percent of the population) has been made worse off.6 5 This has lead to a loss of
hope, indeed, even to a sense of desperation on the part of the vast majority of
Haitians. Moreover, this sad story is a reflection of Haiti's history.
Indeed, the history of Haiti is a troubled tale of military violence and political
corruption. With the singular exception of one regime that governed between 1818
and 1843, Haiti has been plagued by ceaseless coups, assassinations, and massive
violations of human rights.66 The only period of relative stability was between
1915 and 1934 when the United States Marines occupied the country in order to

Western Hemisphere. The under-five mortality rate in 2004 was 117 per 1,000 live births. Id. at 2060. In
fact, one of every fourteen babies in Haiti dies before reaching his or her first birthday. U.N.
CHILDREN'S FUND [UNICEF], CHILD ALERT: HAITI 1 (2006), availableat http://www.unicef.org/child
alert/haiti/. Moreover, in 2007, the life expectancy at birth was 57.03 years. CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK 2007, at 250 (2007). Malnutrition is, of course, another serious
problem. Indeed, one of every three children in Haiti is chronically malnourished. Specialist Tries To
Reverse Malnutritionin Haiti,BIOTECH L. WKLY., Sept. 1, 2006, at 457.
64.
Indeed, before the restoration of the Aristide government, the military leaders appeared to be
taking over the economic monopolies of the nation, which were traditionally controlled by the economic
elites. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Haiti's Curse; Power Means Brutality; Practice Makes Perfect,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1993, § 4, at 1.
65.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2003 (2004), available at http://www.stat
e.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27902.htm.
66.
Although Haiti enjoyed relative political stability under Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818-43), his
methods were certainly not always just. See DAVID NICHOLLS, FROM DESSALINES To DUVALIER:
RACE, COLOUR AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN HAITI 67-82 (1979). See also MICHEL-ROLPH
TROUILLOT, HAM, STATE AGAINST NATION: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF DUVALIERISM 47-50
(1990).

2010]1

THE TRUTHABOUTHAITI

17

insure United States commercial privileges.6 7 When the troops were finally
removed, conventional hostilities with the Dominican Republic resumed.68
The history of Haiti is also one of sharply opposed interests, starkly competing
visions of state and nation, and a rigid class structure. If "the Haitian mind" or
attitude is meant to signify the political, economic, and social positions of the
majority, Haitians have been of one attitude only twice in their history. Their first
coming together as a people was in 1791-1804, when they bravely stood together
against slavery and French colonialism. Their second coming together as a people
was in 1990, when at least a sixty-seven percent majority elected Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to the presidency in the country's first democratic and free elections. The
events that have occurred since that election, however, reflect the incredibly deep
divisions that have developed in this society between these two defining moments
in the life of the Haitian nation. Class structure, not merely income, and historical
tides, not simply the immediate past, are at the roots of Haiti's modem crisis.
Indeed, a positive resolution of this crisis is impossible unless these cultural and
historical issues are understood and confronted.
Haiti is the product of a revolution against slavery and colonialism. It emerged
as a nation in 1804, from the destruction of the French colony of SaintDomingue. By the late eighteenth century, approximately 1790, Saint-Domingue
was reputed to be the most profitable colony of the Western World. Indeed, it

The occupation of Haiti by the United States may have stabilized the currency and briefly
67.
reduced administrative corruption, but the overall effect of the occupation severely damaged Haiti in a
variety of ways. TROUILLOT, supra note 66, at 100-08. See e.g., HAITI - TODAY AND TOMORROW: AN
HAITI SINCE
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 255-56 (1984); AMY WILENTZ, THE RAINY SEASON:
DUVALIER 77 (1989); Johnathan Power, Haiti Still Has a Chance to Survive, CALGARY HERLAD, Nov.
1, 1993, at A4. For a more detailed account of the American occupation of Haiti, see HANS SCHMIDT,
THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF HAITI 1915-1934 (1971).
Indeed Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been at odds since the beginning of the
68.
nineteenth century, when France acquired Santa Domingo from Spain in 1793 by the Treaty of Basel.
French control over the island had already been disrupted by the slave revolt in 1791. In 1801,
Troussaint Louverture, after establishing his authority in Saint-Domingue, occupied Santo Domingo. He
promulgated a constitution, which proclaimed him (as governor-general) sovereign over the whole
island of Hispaniola, where Haiti and the Dominican Republic are situated. This constitution gave
subsequent Haitian rulers the so-called legal basis for their attempts to regain possession over the
eastern part of the island. After the French withdrawal from Saint-Domingue in November 1803,
Touissant's successors, Generals Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henri Christophe, attempted to expel the
French who still remained in Santa Domingo. But the French brought in reinforcements and forced the
Haitians to retreat. While retreating, the Haitians looted and slaughtered Dominicans, which became the
bases for indictments by Dominican historians of Haitian "barbarism."
In 1821, President Jean-Pierre Boyer of Haiti, responding to overtures from some Dominicans,
invaded the Dominican Republic, and by February of 1822 had conquered the entire island. He
reasserted the principle of the indivisibility over the island. This invasion began a twenty-one year
period in which Haitians took over most of the administrative posts in Santa Domingo and ruled with an
authoritarian hand. Boyer abolished slavery, but revived forced labor. He closed the university and left
many churches without priests. In February 1844, the Dominicans revolted and won their independence
from Haiti. Hostilities between Haiti and Dominican Republic continue through today. See HOWARD J.
WIARDA & MICHAEL J. KRYZANCK, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, A CARIBBEAN CRUCIBLE, 25-28
(1992); JAMES KNIPPERS BLACK, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AN
UNSOVEREIGN STATE 17-19 (1986).
69.

This included all of Haiti and Santo Domingo.
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established world production records for coffee and sugar.o It was, however, also
the worst place in the world to be a black African slave. The French colonialists
imported many more enslaved Africans than almost any plantation society in the
Americas, including the United States. Unfortunately, it also killed these slaves at a
much more rapid rate through general mistreatment and harsh labor conditions.
Finally, in August 1791, the slaves of Saint Domingue revolted. Under the
successive leadership of two figures who later became Haiti's national heroesToussaint Louverture and Jean-Jacques Dessalines-they defeated Napolean's
army, allegedly the strongest army in the world, after twelve years of a brutal,
protracted struggle. This was an incredible victory at this time for the Haitian
people. Indeed, during this period it was almost impossible to believe that such a
guerilla force could defeat the most powerful army in the world. Thus, the first
major large-scale successful slave revolt in the Americas helped create one of the
first independent states of the Americas and, not incidentally, the first black state of
the Americas.
The revolution was, on one level, both a revolution for social justice in Haiti
and a victory against French colonialism. It was also significant for broader
reasons. It foreshadowed the independence of Latin America in general, and the
destruction of African-American slavery. Nevertheless, the European powers and
the United States did not easily accept the revolution. They ostracized Haiti
diplomatically. Even though they traded with Haiti, they did so only on the harsh
terms they imposed. The reasons were clear. In 1791, European powers controlled
Caribbean colonies and freely and happily accepted African slavery.
Representatives of Southern States in the United States Congress, of course, argued
vehemently against the recognition of Haitian independence, fearing that such
recognition would encourage black slaves in the United States to revolt. Thus, the
United States did not recognize Haitian independence until 1862, when the Civil
War brought an unexpected need for cotton and destroyed Southern power and
influence in Washington.
The French did try to take back Haiti in 1825. France did not reclaim the
former colony, but did force Haiti to pay reparations for land which French citizens
had forfeited during the rebellion. The former French plantation owners originally
encouraged the French government to invade Haiti and to re-enslave the black
Haitians. But the French had no taste for another war. Instead, France issued the
Royal Ordinance of 1825, which called for huge indemnity payments. In addition
to a 150 million gold Franc payment, France decreed that French ships and
commercial goods entering and leaving Haiti must be discounted fifty percent.72

70.
See SCHMIDT, supra note 67, at 19-41.
71.
See Charles H. Wesley, The Struggle for the Recognition of Haiti and Liberia as
Independent Republics, 2 J. NEGRO HIST. 369, (1917); Noe Dorestant, A Look at HaitianHistory 18032008, 205 Years ofIndependence, HERrTAGEKoNPA.COM, http://www.heritagekonpa.com/archives/Haiti
an%20History.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
72.
J. Damu, Haiti Makes the Casefor Reparations: The Meter is Running at $34 Per Second
FINALCALL.coM NEWS, http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/article_1290.shtml (last updated Feb.
10, 2004).
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This further weakened-indeed almost totally frustrated-Haiti's ability to pay the
ransom for recognition.
According to the French, the terms of the edict were non-negotiable. Indeed,
the French sent twelve warships armed with 500 cannons to impress upon the
Haitian people the seriousness of the situation. According to a memorandum
drafted by the colonists' lawyers, France based its 150 million gold Franc
indemnity requirement on profits earned by the colonists. 73
In 1789, Saint Domingue exported 150 million Francs worth of products to
France. In 1823, Haitian exports to France, England, and the United States totaled
thirty million Francs. The lawyers argued that one-half of the thirty million Francs
went toward the cost of production, leaving fifteen million francs of profit. 74 The
lawyers took the fifteen million Francs balance and multiplied it by ten - ten years
worth of lost profits for the French colonists because of the war for independence.
In addition, and what made matters worse, the French required Haiti to secure a
loan to pay the first installment on the indemnity. France forced Haiti to borrow
the thirty million Francs from a French bank that then deducted the management
fees from the face value of the loan and charged interest rates so exorbitant that
after Haiti completed repayment, it still owed six million Francs. The 150 million
gold Franc indemnity represented France's annual budget and ten years of revenue
for Haiti. * It cost Haiti 150 million gold Francs in return for national recognition
and the United States and Britain sided with France. The French government bled
the nation and rendered it a failed state. It was a merciless exploitation that was
designed and guaranteed to collapse the Haitian economy and society.
Haiti was forced to pay the sum until 1947,n when the last installment was
made. During the nineteenth century, the payment to France amounted to up to
seventy percent (70%) of Haiti's foreign exchange earnings.7 8 The money was in
exchange for recognizing the country as a sovereign nation. Haiti was isolated at
birth-ostracized and denied access to world trade, finance, and international
development. It is one of the most vicious examples of national strangulation
recorded in modem history. Indeed the value of the amount has been estimated in
2001 at twenty-one billion dollars! 79
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The revolution failed for perhaps an even more significant and insidious
reason. The Haitian elites attempted to treat the rural masses in much the same way
as the Western nations-particularly France-had treated them. Almost
immediately after independence, the elites attempted to recreate the plantation
economy. The former slaves, however, despised plantation labor; they simply
refused to return to a state of slavery. Instead, they settled as small peasants on
land bought or reconquered from the State or abandoned by large landowners.
The urban elites devised a complicated but effective strategy to counter this
problem.s0 The first part of the strategy was economic. The elites used the fiscal
and marketing systems of the country to create wealth producing mechanisms for
themselves. These mechanisms, in turn, allowed the elites to steal the productive
labor capacities of the rural peasants. The elites became traders, politicians, and
State employees. They prospered by living off the peasants' labor. Taxes collected
by the import-export bourgeoisie at the urban markets and custom houses-and
paid by the peasants-provided almost the entire source of government revenues.
In 1842, for example, perhaps as much as ninety percent (90%) of government
revenues were collected at the customhouses. In 1891, more than ninety percent
(90%) of State income came from the heavy hand of import and export taxes.
Coffee, Haiti's main agricultural export, became the central focus of the elites'
fiscal policy. They taxed this product almost beyond its limits. As the favorite
peasant crop to exploit, the coffee crop accounted for approximately sixty (60%) to
ninety percent (90%) of government revenues from the late 1800's to the first half
of the twentieth century. Moreover, until recently, charges on coffee amounted to a
forty percent (40%) tax on personal income. But, after more than two hundred
years of independence, the government has yet to collect income taxes from most
merchants, civil servants, or middle class employees.
In addition to coffee, successive Haitian governments heavily taxed food and
other necessities, such as flour, oil, candles, kerosene, and matches. Indeed, when
coffee exports fell, taxes on the necessities rose to offset this shortage. Luxury
8
items for the elites, however, entered the country free of any tariffs. '
The economic response of the elites posed serious obstacles to the creation of
any form of democratic government. The elites made sure that they received their
wealth, even if it meant killing the nation. The State reproduced itself by living off
the peasants and abusing them; the urban classes reproduced themselves by taking
over the State and the wealth of the peasantry.
These choices by the elites inevitably led to the needless death of innumerable
people, destruction of any progressive social and political movements, and, of
course, political instability. To limit the problems of political and social instability,
the second part of the elites' strategy took effect. This strategy was to isolate the
This dual strategy was set up during the presidencies of Alexandre Petion (1807-18) and
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peasantry on its small mountain plots and therefore keep them away from politics.
It was a brilliant, but corrupt, strategy. The very peasants who unknowingly
subsidized the elites and the State had no input whatsoever in how it was to be run.
They were kept away from the political process "legally" and illegally through
manipulation of election laws and harsh repression. For example, before the
twentieth-century, it is highly unlikely that any elected politician ever received as
many as one thousand legitimate votes. 82 Before the Duvalidr dictatorship, many
peasants could not even name the President. The peasants encountered the State
mainly through the preseptd, who collected their market taxes, and through the chef
seksyon (section chief), a member of the Army, who acted as the sole
representative of all three branches of government in the rural parts of the country.
It is clearly not an exaggeration to claim that the rural areas of Haiti were a colony
of the urban elites. Even today many of these rural areas and the urban ghettos
remain colonies.
The Haitian Creole language, as well as the Haitian culture, emphasizes the
overwhelming rift between the elites and the peasants. The great divide is
registered in several complex and subtle ways. The languages of Haiti and their
uses suggest a variety of barriers. For example, the word letah in Creole means
both "the state" and "a bully." The urban people, in turn, refer to the rural peasants
as moun andewoi, which means "outsiders."
There are other, more subtle language barriers. All Haitians speak Haitian
Creole. Less than eight to ten percent of the population, however, speaks French
reasonably well enough to claim some form of fluency in that language. But this is
not all. Only a tiny minority within the elites are truly bilingual in both French and
Creole.
Religious convictions and their representations also work to divide Haitians
culturally. Practices and beliefs associated with the major Haitian folk religion,
Vodoun, are ubiquitous among the elites, despite their publicly proclaimed
adherence to Christianity. In addition, a large percentage of the peasantry claims to
be Roman Catholic Christians. Indeed, they practice it and follow the annual cycle
of Roman Catholic events. But they also refer to themselves as "servants of the
gods," members of the major folk religion-Vodoun. Publicly, however, the elites
associate Voudon with evil while consistently practicing aspects of it. But they do
not stop at strong public criticism of Vodoun. Perhaps even more significant is the
fact that successive Haitian authoritarian governments, before the Aristide and
Prdval administrations, have persecuted many of the people who publicly practice
Vodoun. Unfortunately, the persecution had been encouraged and even generated
by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

Historians regard the legislatives elections of 1870 in Port-au-Prince as one of the few
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Thus, the fundamental cultural division is not necessarily based on a difference
in cultural repertoire. Rather, this division is based on the uses of these sometimes
quite subtle differences to create a formidable social barrier. For example, more
important than the fact of bilingualism are the number of times an elite child is told
that it is unacceptable for a member of his class to speak Creole. Moreover, until
Aristide's reinstatement to office, the French language had traditionally been used
in schools and in the court systems. While Aristide attempted to change this, it
remains the language of choice, in both the schools and the courts. The language
barrier, therefore, obviously denies majority participation in those institutions.
Ninety percent of Haitians are excluded from power.
There is another significant problem that exacerbates all of these issues. There
also exists in Haiti historical tension between the older "mulatto" elite and the
"black" middle class. This is, however, a very complicated issue. No aspect of
Haitian history is more confusing than the physical appearance of its people. Haiti
is said to be divided by color, but that is certainly inexact. It is closer to the truth to
say that there is a wide situational variability in consciousness of color, and that,
for many people, light skin is symbolically important. But this statement merely
skims the surface of the issue.84 The skin color of people must be seen as part of a
perceptual whole that is much larger than color. It includes hair type, nose type, lip
type, eye color, ear size, and other features, such as amount of body and face hair,
and body type. The issue of color is even more complicated. It also includes such
factors as the appearance of one's siblings and their in-laws. For men in particular,
the color and appearance of one's wife and her family is extremely relevant. Even
more important, it is not clear that color determined the emergence of a ruling class
so much as did education, military record, and personal connections. Thus, while
color is a significant cultural question, it was not at the birth of the nation, nor is it
today, so neatly defining a term that social groups can safely be described in those
terms.
There is a further complication. All Haitians sincerely consider themselves
members of the African race, and claim their bonds of brotherhood with all their
race brothers. Nevertheless, educated Haitians have always shared the European's
paternalistic disparagement of things African. Indeed, not only did Haitians
consider themselves intellectually superior to their African cousins, they considered
themselves more aesthetically pleasing. The Haitian mulatto elite and the black
middle class were also satisfied to adopt Western intellectual and aesthetic norms
and to distance themselves from their African origins. But this does not bode well
for the black middle class. While internalizing these mulatto attitudes, the black
middle class did not have any biological ties to Europeans. The problem runs
deeper. The majority of important positions in government, public administration,
and diplomacy were long monopolized by light-skinned Haitians whose social
clubs refused admission to those with undesirable skin color.
This color discrimination pervades all aspects of social life, including the
selection of partners. As Leon-Francois Hoffmann tells us:
84.
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Marriage partners were valued in exact relation to their phenotype, the
ideal being to "marry lighter" than oneself and thereby "improve the race"
(amiliorerla raz). Mulatto girls were thus encouraged to marry foreign
whites, and only if they belonged to rich or powerful families could young
black women aspire to a mulatto husband. While this internalization of
anti-black racialism is far from unknown in the rest of the Caribbean, it is
especially shocking and paradoxical in the country which has always
defined itself as the Black Republic.8 5
Thus, Haitians are acutely aware that, while they risk discrimination by Western
nations based on their color, they exercise, or are the victims of the same
discrimination in their own country.
Two major aspects of Haitian life emerge from this sketch. First, the same elite
groups that have traditionally exercised political and economic control of Haiti,
have totally rejected and ostracized the present majority. Second, the elites have coopted the State and used it as the key mechanism of both rejection and control.
Stated otherwise, the elites believed and continue to believe their lifestyle to be
more important than the survival of the majority. That choice meant using the State
to expropriate the economic output of the majority and simultaneously to repress
them. As many Haitians, and others, have so eloquently argued, the Haitian State is
predatory; it has always operated against the nation it claims to represent.
The 1915-1934 United States occupation of Haiti did not alleviate, but instead
exacerbated this situation. The occupation left the county with a weaker civil
society and a solidified state apparatus. First, the United States Marines reinforced
the fiscal and economic power of Port-au-Prince. They did this most obviously by
centralizing the customhouses. Second, and more significantly, the occupying
forces consciously contributed to the centralization of political power in Port-auPrince by "pacifying" the countryside. This took the form of "modernizing" the socalled rural police (chefs de sections), and by creating a new Haitian army, the very
army that the Aristide and Prival governments have attempted to dismantle and
contain. The first Haitian army, borne of the war against France, could legitimately
claim a patriotic mission. The Haitian Garde, however, was created specifically to
keep the Haitians in line. Indeed, this force has never fought anyone but Haitians.
In contrast to the first Haitian army, whose allegiances were primarily regional, the
army created by the marines was heavily centralized.
Centralization meant that power could be more efficiently organized. Thus, it
became easier for would-be dictators to control the State. For example, the cadets
of the Military School set up by the United States Marines took part in the
overthrow of President Elie Lescot (1941-1946), and in the nomination and
overthrow of his successor, Dumarsais Estim6 (1946-1950). They then placed one
of their own, Paul Magloire (1950-1956), in the presidency. By the time Magloire
85.
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left office, the army had become the power behind the throne, the determining
factor of Haitian politics.
Any notion of stability from that point meant dictatorship. First, it was the
regime of Frangois ("Papa Doc") Duvali6r, who ruled with an iron fist between
1957 and his death in 1971 with the aid of a maniacal private security force known
as the Tonton Macoutes.8 7 Papa Doc consolidated his power quickly and
ruthlessly, eviscerating individual liberties and political opposition with equal
dispatch. Indeed, over forty thousand Haitians reportedly lost their lives as the
victims of official brutality.88 Duvali6r stole over five hundred million dollars in
foreign aid and taxes and deposited the money into personal accounts in Haiti and
abroad. 9 Officials at all levels of government, taking their cue from Duvali6r, took
part in similar acts of corruption. 90
Papa Doc Duvali6r certainly learned the lessons of Haiti's military well. He
gradually discharged most senior officers in the army and then relied heavily on
their successors to build the most centralized power in the history of the nation.
Then, he closed the Military School. By employing the full powers of the
centralized State, Duvalier formalized a system of absolute individual power. He
created an all-powerful and intensely personalized executive branch that created
and controlled all State activities, from family life to military training. The State
even controlled the writing of National School exams. Its apparatus also attacked
all the groupings and institutions of civil society-from athletic teams to trade
unions. Haiti thus became an authoritarian State.

Papa Doc remained in power for over fourteen years, and, in order to insure a
legacy of Duvali6r control over the country, organized a fraudulent referendum on
January 31, 1971, in which voters "approved" his nineteen-year-old son, JeanClaude ("Baby Doc"), as his successor. 91 When his father died, Jean-Claude
became "President for Life." His rule was almost as repressive as his father's. In
1986, however, when the levels of economic disparities and political corruption
92
reached ungovernable proportions, Baby Doc fled Haiti for exile in France.

87.

See George DeWan, Reigns of Terror,N. Y. TIMES, July 31, 1991, at A3. Also see BERNARD

DIEDERICH & AL BURT, PAPA Doc: HAITI AND ITS DICTATOR I passim (1986); JAMES FERGUSON,
PAPA Doc, BABY Doc: HAITI AND THE DUVALIERS 30-59 (1987).

FERGUSON, supra note 87, at 57 (estimating the number as up to 60,000, with millions more
88.
exiled).
TRoUILLOT, supra note 66, at 213-14, 226.
89.
Id. at 175-77.
90.
On January 22, 1971, the official gazette, Le Moniteur, carried the amendments that were to
91.
be voted on in the national referendum. One of the amendments included lowering the minimum age for
the presidency from forty to eighteen. The ballot stated that Jean-Claude had been chosen to succeed his
father and listed two questions plus the answer: "Does this choice answer your aspirations? Do you
ratify it? Answer: yes." Francois Duvalier, Proclamation,LE MONTEUR, Jan. 22, 1971, at BI-2. The
official count was 2,391,916 in favor and, of course, not a single vote was opposed. See e.g., DIEDERICH
& BURT, supra note 87, at 397.
Fearing for his life, and after a series of riots broke out across Haiti in February 1986,
92.
Duvalidr fled Haiti in a United States cargo plane with his family and seventeen "associates." See
Biography: Jean-Claude Duvalidr,ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.com/topic/jean-claude-duvalier
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010).

2010]

THE TRUTH ABOUT HAITI

25

The senior Duvalidr achieved his aim only because of the role played by the
State in Haitian history since independence. Duvalidr was a very clever dictator,
but he did not succeed simply because of his cleverness. Duvalidrism invented few
formulas of power. Instead, it systematically codified historical practices of the
Haitian State. For example, the methods of the Tonton Macoutes are almost
identical to the practices developed and refined by the death squads in earlier
Haitian history. Similarly, the Duvali6r State systematized and multiplied the
practice and power of the State to extract money from the average rural peasant and
urban citizen. For example, the Duvali6r government centralized the management
of coffee exports and, simultaneously, dramatically increased taxes. The Executive
and its favored elites took complete control of the basic commodities, such as oil,
flour, and tobacco. They even determined the import and distribution policies of
these commodities. These forces simply raided the treasury. Indeed, they made
their personal fortunes the very raisond'etre of State revenue.
The systematizing of the extractive and repressive power of the State
significantly worsened the plight of the Haitian nation. Decisions that made almost
everyone worse off, such as predatory price policies, geometrically increased the
speed of environmental degradation. Impoverished peasants rushed to urban
centers. Bypassing the peasants, Baby Doc Duvalidr tried to take advantage of this
increased urban labor force to create an economic reversal. But the rapid spread of
what are often termed light assembly industries, had the opposite effect. These
assembly industries, subcontracted to United States firms, only reinforced
polarization. This contributed to an increase in the already huge gap between the
economic and social elites and the poverty stricken peasants, and to the urban civil
uprisings in the mid-1980s. This forced Jean-Claude Duvalidr into exile in
February 1986. He left behind a much poorer country, an almost depleted
economy, and even more desperate peasants.
Today, Haiti remains one of the poorest countries in the world. But to make
matters worse, it is also one of the most polarized and unequal in wealth and access
to education, healthcare, and of course, to political power. The power elite-the
same groups of families that have controlled the nation since its independence from
France-continues to dominate the country and its economy while more than half
of the population, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , survive
on a household income of around forty-four cents per day.
Mass destitution has grown far more common and severe in recent decades.
Starting in the 1970s, internationally imposed neo-liberal "adjustments" and
austerity measures finally succeeded in doing what no Haitian government had
managed to do since winning independence in 1804: in order to set the country on
the road towards "economic development", they have driven large numbers of
small farmers off their land and into densely crowded urban slums. Only a small
minority of these internal refugees have been lucky enough to find sweatshop jobs
Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Haiti:Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,IMF Country
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that pay the lowest wages in the region. These wages currently average two or
three dollars a day. In real terms, they are worth less than a quarter of their 1980
value.
The economic elite gained their power not only through the political,
economic, and social policies they created to exclude and exploit the majority; they
also employed violence to gain their privilege. It is only violence that allows the
elite to retain them. For much of the twentieth century, Haiti's military and
paramilitary forces-with substantial amounts of U.S. support-were able to
preserve these privileges on their own. Over the course of the 1980s, however, it
began to look as if local military repression might no longer be up to the job.
Lavalas, the massive popular mobilization culminated in 1990 with the landslide
election of the liberation theologian Jean-Bertand Aristide, the first democratically
elected President in the history of Haiti. Suddenly the majority of excluded,
ordinary people began to participate in the political system for the first time. As
Robert Fatton states, "panic seized the dominant class. It dreaded living in close
proximity to la populace and barricaded itself against Lavalas." 94
Nine months later, the army dealt with this popular threat in its usual violent
way, with a coup d'dtat. Over the next three years the army systematically
murdered approximately 5,000 Aristide supporters. When the United States
eventually allowed Aristide to return in October 1994, he took a surprising and
unprecedented step: he abolished the army that had deposed him. It is impossible
to overestimate the importance of this act. It has been called the greatest human
rights development in Haiti since emancipation. 95 It is wildly popular. In 2000, the
Haitian electorate gave Aristide a second overwhelming mandate when his party
96
FanmiLavalas won more than ninety percent (90%) of the seats in parliament.
More than anything else, what has happened in Haiti since the election of
Aristide in 1990 must be understood as the playing out, perhaps even the
resolution, of this dichotomy-democracy or repression led by the army. In 2000,
the overwhelming victory of the Fanmi Lavalas, at all levels of government, raised
the prospect of genuine political change in a context in which there was no obvious
extra-political mechanism-no army-to stop it. In order to avoid this outcome, the
main strategy of Haiti's small ruling class has been to redefine political questions
in terms of "stability" and "security", in particular the security of property and
investments.
As soon as Aristide was re-elected in 2000, a systematic campaign to bankrupt
and destabilize his second government set the stage for a paramilitary insurrection
and another coup d'dtat. In 2004, thousands of United States troops again invaded
Haiti (just as they did back in 1994) in order to "restore stability and security" to
their "troubled island neighbor." An expensive and long-term United Nations
94.
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stabilization mission, staffed by 9,000 heavily armed troops, soon took over the job
of helping to pacify the population and criminalize any resistance. By the end of
2006, thousands more Aristide supporters had been killed.9 7
Between 2006 and 2009, a clearly intimidated ("stabilized") Pr6val Haitian
government agreed to continue privatizing the country's remaining public assets,
vetoed a proposal to raise minimum wages to five dollars a day, and banned Fanmi
Lavalas and several other political parties from participating in the next round of
legislative elections.9 8
When it comes to providing stability, today's United Nations troops are clearly
a big improvement over the Haitian army. But the latter is beginning, once again,
to "remerge from the shadows." The elites continue to try to restore their own
army. The fight between repression led by the army and democracy continues
unabated. The outcome of this "struggle" will certainly be instrumental in deciding
the fate of the Haitian people.
The conversion to a non-Duvalidrist regime is only one of the transitions Haiti
must face. The other is internalization in the hearts and minds of the people of the
rule of law, and to its everyday practice in both the public and private spheres. But
there is a strange cycle that seems to recreate itself in Haiti. If Duvalidrism impedes
the creation of the rule of law, the weakness of democratic institutions keeps
Duvalidrism alive. The Haitian "problem" is not merely political. Rather it is much
more complicated. It resides in the rigid class structure, in the military organization
of a nation that seems to be at war with itself, in an economic system that tends to
discourage production and investment, and in socio-cultural elitism.
Legitimacy of the State requires the participation of Haiti's majority in
deciding the fate of the country. It requires the recognition by all sections of
Haitian society-particularly the urban elites and their foreign partners-that Haiti
is fundamentally a nation of extremely poor, rural peasants and ghetto residents
who must somehow be incorporated into the life of Haiti as equal partners. To put
it another way, Haitian democracy will have to develop in the rural areas and in the
city ghettos or it will simply not be able to develop at all.
Under the best of circumstances, a nation such as Haiti cannot be changed
structurally without some yielding of power by the haves-the economic elite. But,
of course, rulers who profit from stasis are disinclined to risk change. Moreover, if
it is to be the policy of the United States and the rest of the international
community, which it appears to be, to sustain at all costs the present distribution of
economic power in Haiti, hardly anything can be done that will necessarily have
long-range beneficial political and social consequences and thus allow Haiti to
become a constitutional democratic nation.
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A second prominent obstacle that nations face in the transition process is the
corrosive power of the phenomenon known as corporatism.9 Indeed, for the
transition process to succeed, the people must dissolve the network of de facto
power relationships, which corporations create and jealously protect by taking
advantage of the power vacuum left by representatives of popular sovereignty.
Under the umbrella of authoritarian rule, a number of social groups representing
particular interests sculpt a place for themselves after a bargaining process which
includes their support for the present regime. Such groups include the military,
religious organizations, coalitions of entrepreneurs, trade unions, and even the socalled independent press. Once democratic rule is established, these groups
stubbomly resist relinquishing their power to representatives of the people.
Corporatism is usually expressed and functions in complicated ways. There is
some control by the State over these interest groups and organizations, many of
which are part of civil society, and there are a variety of official and unofficial
mechanisms that are used to alter their operation. 00 Simultaneously, however,
these organizations exert enormous pressures upon government actors and
agencies. These pressures allow the corporative forces to obtain favored treatment
of various kinds, amounting to a legal monopoly of particular interests. Sometimes
this monopoly power of the corporative interests is unaccompanied by any
significant state influence over these forces. In other situations, alternative legal or
even constitutional privileges short of monopoly may be granted that shield the
organization from the raw competitive forces of popular expression, such as a free
market.
Corporatism is an insidious and powerful force, and it is very difficult to
overcome. Haiti is a harsh example of the devastation created by corporatism.
Between 1991 and 1994 the military corporative forces assumed total power and
influence in, and completely violated and destroyed any semblance of democratic
practices and institutions.'0 1 The military forces consolidated their rule by
intentionally and ruthlessly suppressing Haiti's once diverse and vibrant civil
society. They assassinated approximately 5000 people, brutalized and tortured
thousands of others, and forced perhaps 500,000 people to go underground. 0 2 Until
the 1990 coup d'dtat, Haiti boasted a huge assortment of peasant associations,
grass-roots development projects, trade unions, student organizations, church
groups, and independent radio stations. In the rural areas, local groups, generally
known as "popular organizations", formed literacy programs, rural development
99.
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projects, and farming cooperatives, often with international support. The military
systematically repressed virtually all forms of independent associations in an
attempt to deny the Haitian people any organized base for opposition to the brutal
dictatorship. Their apparent goal was to push Haiti back into an atomized and
fearful society reminiscent of the Duvalidr era. The strategy seemed to be that even
if the international community successfully returned Aristide to power, he would
find it almost impossible to transform his popularity into the kind of organized
support necessary to exert civilian control over the army and in creating a
democratic institutional structure that would aid in that endeavor. The cost to the
Haitian people has been astronomical. At that time, the very civil society that Haiti
needed and still needs to confront its economic and social problems had nearly
been destroyed.
Aristide's major accomplishment as President was to abolish the military.'0 3
Since 1994, the democratically elected governments have attempted to prosecute
military officials who were involved in massive human rights violations. For
example, in August 1995, a mid-level member of the paramilitary group Front for
the Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH) was convicted of the murder of
Antoine Izmery, a prominent businessman and supporter of Aristide. This was the
first time in Haitian history that anyone had been convicted of a major human
rights violation.
There have also been on-going investigations of other human rights offenses
committed by the de facto regime between 1991 and 1994 since the return of
Aristide in 1994. On September 20, 2000, after an investigation that started shortly
after President Aristide's reinstatement in 1994, the Haitian government began the
prosecution of dozens of former military leaders for the massacre of at least fifteen
residents of a poor neighborhood in Gonaives in April 1994. The Raboteau slayings
were part of a series of attacks undertaken by the coup leaders to break support for
Aristide. At the trial, only twenty-two of the defendants actually appeared in court.
On November 9, 2000, sixteen of these twenty-two defendants were convicted of
taking part in the massacre. Twelve of the sixteen, including the military
commander of the town at the time of the massacre, Captain Castera Cnafils, and a
grassroots figure turned paramilitary leader, Jean Tatoune, were sentenced to life in
prison with hard labor. The other four defendants received sentences of up to nine
years imprisonment. Six defendants were acquitted. All of the convicted defendants
also were ordered to pay the equivalent of $2,300-a large amount in Haiti-to a
fund to benefit the families of the victims.
On November 16, 2000, a Haitian court sentenced the fifteen defendants who
did not appear in court, and were tried in absentia, to life in prison with hard labor.
The absent defendants include coup leaders Raoul Cedras and Philippe Biamby,
both of whom received asylum in Panama; former Port-au-Prince police chief,
Michel Francois, who is in Honduras; and paramilitary leader Emmanuel Constant,
who cut a deal with the C.I.A. and lives in New York City. Prosecutors alleged that
Interview with Brian Conconnan, Executive Director, Inst. for Justice and Democracy for
103.
Haiti (1995-2010).
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they masterminded the attack. Lawyers were not allowed to defend the absent
defendants. Judge Napla Saintil tried them without a jury exclusively on the basis
of a 172-page bill of accusation presented to the court by the Haitian government
prosecutors. The absent defendants will be arrested if they return to Haiti, but
would have the right to a new trial if they return. Moreover, the Haitian
government has asked a number of nations, including the United States, to extradite
several former military officials who have been indicted in Haiti for committing
murders during the coup period. The United States has refused to do so.'0
Continuing the prosecutions has been an almost impossible task because
security is an absolute necessity to pursue this strategy. With approximately
250,000 automatic weapons cached around the country,105 stability remains fragile.
The failure to understand corporative power and the fear of placing international
forces in harm's way led to a failure by the multinational forces to disarm the
military, in spite of the fact that such a campaign was clearly compatible with the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 940.106 Part of this misunderstanding
was the belief that removal of all privately held weapons in Haiti would have
seriously disturbed the balance of power in Haitian society, dangerously
concentrating all fire power in the hands of a democratically elected government
whose long-term commitment to the rule of law and democracy could not be
guaranteed. This grave error has led to unnecessary suffering. Indeed, the
international community's failure to disarm the former military forces has led to a
surge in garden variety crimes, attacks on Parliament and on the Haitian National
Police, an increasingly large number of drug related murders committed by former
military officials who have formed criminal gangs, 0 7 and the second violent
overthrow of the democratically elected Aristide government.
The Catholic Church is another significant corporative source in Haiti. The
Catholic Church hierarchy in Haiti has for years been siding with the military and
the economic elite. It has even been a catalyst for the repression of those who
publicly practice Vodoun, even though almost every Haitian, including the
economic elite, practices it in private. Moreover, the Vatican is the only nation in
the world to have recognized the political legitimacy of the 1990 military coup, and
the church hierarchy has consistently opposed Aristide and other democratically
elected officials. Local churches, however, have long helped the people of Haiti by
nurturing the populist groups in rural areas. For example, the Catholic Church has
long sponsored literacy programs for the peasants.
The entrepreneurial sector constitutes another corporative source directed at
the democratically elected government. It seeks to obtain a variety of privileges or
protective measures and preserve those previously secured. In Haiti, the
Interview with Brian Concannon, Dir., Exec. Dir., Inst. for Justice and Democracy for Haiti
104.
(1995-2010). This information is personally known to me because I helped investigate the murder and
prosecute the Zimbabwe case. Brian Concannon was instrumental in helping the Haitian government
prosecute the Raboteau slayings.
See Interviews with United States Army official and United Nations officials.
105.
106.
See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
107.
See, e.g., STOTZKY, supranote 48.
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entrepreneurial sector has attempted to boycott many measures designed to achieve
progressive levels of taxation.'08 It has also pushed hard for the complete
privatization of nine state owned industries, hoping to secure them and reap huge
profits.109 This elite class has ruled Haiti since its independence in 1804, using the
state resources as its personal bank account and keeping the vast majority of
Haitians in a state of extreme poverty, even slavery.
The great enigma, which is directly related to the controversy surrounding the
first feature of the consolidation-the economic and social crisis-is whether the
previous dominant economic groups remain all-powerful, or have even increased
their power, by having changed their position as privileged contractors of the state
to positions as owners and thus monopolistic providers of the recently privatized
public services.
In Haiti, the question has a rather unusual twist to it. It is whether the previous
dominant economic groups remain powerful or have been reduced to puppets of the
military during the dictatorship, and if so, whether they will reassert their power or
yield some of it to the people. During most of Haiti's history, the military did the
bidding of the elite classes, protecting their economic monopolies and brutally
suppressing the vast majority of the poor. In turn, the rich paid off the dictator.
During the coup, things changed. The military took over the country's ports and
landing strips, thus enabling its high-ranking officers to prosper in the illicit drug
trade. Even more significant, the military increasingly prospered through its
control of state monopolies. It was alarm over these incursions into the economy
that led the economic elite to support, however tentatively, the return of Aristide to
office. The question remains, however, what will the economic elite do now that
the military dictatorship is over and two successive democratic governments have
come to power?
There is a further complication. The corporative actors do not, however, play
the same role in each nation. For example, the Catholic Church does not function in
Haiti as it does in Argentina and trade unions hold different positions in Haiti than
in Brazil. But the script is nevertheless repeated in each country because the formal
creation or establishment of democratic rule is simply not sufficient to destroy the
corporative power relationships built up during the dictatorship periods. The
corporations try to preserve their power relations and privileges through the
transition, generating different types of crises, such as a military or economic
Indeed, directly after the 1990 election, President Aristide called in the prominent families
108.
of Haiti to discuss their refusal to pay taxes. He told them that he would not impose taxes retroactively,
even though they owed incredibly large sums of money. He stated that they would not have to pay taxes
for the many years that they refused to pay before his election. Nevertheless, they would have to pay
taxes in the future. The elites responded by telling Aristide that he would not be in office long enough to
collect their taxes. Less than a month later, he was ousted from office by a military coup. Interview with
President Aristide (1991-1994); STOTZKY, supra 48, at 90 n.18; Interview with Brian Concannon,
Director, Executive Director, Institute for Justice and Democracy for Haiti (1994 - 2010); Interview with
Leon-Francois Hoffman, supra note 62.
109. Interviews with the Power Elite Families in Haiti (1994 - 2008). In these interviews, these
elites constantly refer to their desire to maintain their monopolies on state-owned industries, particularly
the power and communications industries.
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threat, which exert tremendous pressure on the fragile economic and political
regime.
Connected in a multitude of ways and indeed inextricably bound up with these
two features of the transition and consolidation process (the economic, political,
and social crises and the problems of corporatism) is a third factor-the failure to
fulfill the requirements of the rule of law in both the formal and informal aspects of
public and private life. In Haiti, as in virtually every other nation undergoing the
transition from dictatorship to democracy, this failure manifests itself in the
concentration of power solely in the executive branch of government, leading to
massive human rights abuses and a total disregard for the functions of the other
branches of government. For example, during the coup period (1991-1994),
members of the Haitian armed forces systematically assassinated and tortured
thousands of people, including government officials who attempted to uphold the
rule of law.n 0 Indeed, the military blatantly ignored judicial orders to arrest
soldiers or officers accused of human rights abuses."' It ignored the basic rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and any laws passed by Parliament which
threatened its hold on power." 2 Indeed, Haitian prisons were and remain death
traps. Innocent pretrial detainees are often incarcerated for years without being
given a judicial hearing. Cells are packed like sardine cans, causing illness and
death. Moreover, there is no judicial independence. In light of this and Haiti's
history of these abuses, a Creole proverb aptly summarizes the Haitian people's
view about law: "Law is paper; bayonet is steel."
The violation of legal norms, however, is not restricted to formal military or de
facto government officials. Unfortunately, such behavior is a distinguishing mark
110.
The Platform of Haitian Organizations for the Defense of Human Rights (La Plate-Forme
des Organismes Haitiens de D6fense des Droits Humains) documented 1,021 cases of extrajudicial
executions from October 1991 to August 1992 and estimates the number of cases could be as high as
3,000. Memorandum to the Org. of American States (OAS) Comm'n to Haiti 3, Aug. 17, 1992. Perhaps
several thousand more Haitians have been murdered since that time, and thousands have been illegally
arrested, detained, and tortured. Indeed, estimates suggest that at least 5,000 and perhaps as many as
6,000 people were executed between the occurrence of the 1991 coup and the reinstatement of the
Aristide government. A knowledgeable observer in Haiti estimates that between 200,000 and 400,000
people were also forced into hiding from the time the coup occurred until after Aristide's reinstatement.
Some people were so frightened of the attachds that they remained in hiding for months after Aristide's
return.
Unfortunately, Aristide's reinstatement to office did not totally stop the violence. For example,
during the week of March 25, 1995, approximately twenty-five people were murdered in Port-au-Prince
alone. Many of these were political murders. On March 29, 1995, a prominent coup supporter was
assassinated, and unsubstantiated allegations made by U.S. officials suggest that the interior minister
may have ordered the killing. Further investigation suggests, however, that either paramilitary forces or
criminals involved in the drug trade were behind the murder. Political murders of Aristide supporters
continued throughout President Aristide's final months in office, and into President Prdval's term. The
renewed violence makes it clear that, while the approximate eight-month United States military
occupation, the several-month Multinational Force (MNF) occupation, and the close to two year United
Nations peace-keeping force occupation may have subdued turbulence in Haiti, they have clearly not
eliminated the notorious culture of the political murder and paramilitary terror. See Editorial,Haiti, afier
Six Months, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1995, at A30.
111.
Id.
112.
See id During the most recent interim government period, 2004 - 2006, similar human rights
abuses occurred.
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of political and social life at large, and has existed throughout the nation's history.
This failure to follow the rule of law is evident in both social practices and in the
actions of governmental officials.
This tendency toward unlawfulness does not, however, infect only public
officials. Unfortunately, it equally infects the general society. This mentality
correlates with a general trend toward anomie in society as a whole. It manifests
itself in such things as enormous black markets, tax evasions, corruption in private
economic activities, nonobservance of efficient economic norms, and
noncompliance with the most basic rules of society, such as elementary traffic and
urban regulations. 113
The general tendency towards illegality in public and social life normally
appears in one of two ways. People may adopt a "finalist attitude", where they
agree with the goals of a rule but do not follow the commands of the rule.
Conversely, they may adopt a "formalist attitude", where they blindly comply with
the commands of the rule but ignore its goals. Both of these attitudes are
incompatible with and thus contribute to the continuing difficulty of securing
adherence to the rule of law. They adversely affect the attempt to create a moral
consciousness in the citizenry.
The problem may be intractable because it is so pervasive and, therefore,
difficult to change. This unlawfulness mentality is often the product and cause of
collective action problems, such as those with structures that game theory labels
"prisoners dilemma," "assurance game," and "chicken game." Frequently, the
combination of expectations, interests, possibilities of actions, and their respective
payoffs is such that the rational course of action for each participant in the process
of political or social interaction advises that person not to comply with a certain
norm, despite the fact that general compliance with it would have been for the
benefit of everybody in-Pareto's term-or almost everybody.
This kind of anomie may be called "dumb anomie," 114 since it refers to
situations in which the compliance with a certain norm would have led the social
actors to a more efficient result-in Pareto's terms-than what they obtain in the
actual situation of not observing norms. This "dumb anomie" is intimately
connected with both the stunting and the reversal of economic and social
development. First, there is a direct conceptual connection between that kind of
anomie and failures in economic activity. Indeed, "dumb anomie" is identified by
the results of processes of interaction, including economic ones, which do not
observe certain norms. Second, it is clear that anomie affects that process of capital
accumulation. For example, when the behavior of people intervening in the
process of production-even that of judges and government officials-is not
sufficiently predictable, productive investments decline or claim disproportionate
profits.
113.
Argentina is an example of all these problems. See, e.g., Poll Finds CorruptionAlive, Well
in Argentina; Bribery and Tax Evasion Remain Rampant, Survey of Top Executives Shows, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, May 4, 1998, at A7.
114.
Carlos S. Nino also used this term in describing this phenomenon in Argentina. See CARLOS
S. NINo, UN PAls AL MARGEN DE LA LEY (1992).
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Therefore, for a successful transition to democracy to occur in Haiti, it is
critical for the international community to help Haitians consolidate the rule of law.
This is important not only to secure respect for fundamental rights and for the
observance of the democratic process, but also to achieve satisfactory levels of
economic and social development. But the international community seems to have
misunderstood the contours of the rule of law, placing its resources almost solely
into "strengthening the judiciary". Even those efforts have not appreciably
improved the system of justice. In point of fact, despite the international
community's best efforts to help strengthen the integrity of the judicial system, it
remains corrupt and inefficient. Indeed, years of corruption and governmental
neglect have left the judicial system nearly moribund. For example, a shortage of
adequately trained judges and prosecutors, among other systemic problems, has
created a huge backlog of criminal cases, with many detainees waiting months or
even years in pretrial detention before getting a court hearing.11 5 If an accused
person ultimately is tried and found not guilty, there is no redress against the
government for time served.' 16 While it is certainly necessary to strengthen the
judiciary, this is simply insufficient to achieve the goal of establishing the rule of
law in Haiti. But strengthening the judiciary means helping to overcome the
problem of "dumb anomie." The judiciary must be improved by making it more
independent, reliable, and efficient. To achieve that goal, Haiti must satisfy the
guarantees that derive from the ideas of due process of law.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE VISION

While many of these problems and the legacy of their history can only be
overcome by the Haitian people, the international community's help is essential.
But only the correct international incentives directed at the real problems will lead
to a viable, sound democratic revolution in Haiti. So far, these incentives have not
been properly employed. The deepest roots of Haiti's problems lie not simply (or
most significantly) in the country's politics or in its cultural history. Institutional
reforms of the type championed by the international community-such as total
privatization of state owned industries or "judicial reform"-will simply not work
until the more serious problems are confronted. While the moral turpitude of the
elites is real, Haiti's political problems lie in the social and economic organization
of the country. To put it another way, Haiti's crisis lies in social inequality and
economic maldistribution. Unless and until these difficult issues are addressed,
there is little hope for positive changes for the millions of Haitians trapped in
despair and destitution. If they are addressed, however, it is likely that positive
changes in the political sphere will follow. The only hope Haiti has for achieving a
valid democracy is the creation of a new socioeconomic arrangement, which will
be difficult to initiate, and even harder to maintain. But the absence of material
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deprivation is a prerequisite for the conditions necessary to create a constitutional
democracy. What steps must be taken to achieve this goal?
An energized, vital constitutional democracy means much more than holding
periodic elections. It requires an environment of personal security for people to
pursue their desires, their professions, to move about freely, and to explore new
ideas. Democracy also means, among other things, the building of vibrant
institutions of justice and law and the full blooming of civil society-the broad
array of political parties, independent media, independent labor unions, and
nongovernmental organizations, such as women's groups, all of which encourage
political and social participation. While these choices-and democracy is always a
choice-cannot necessarily be imposed by the international community, they
certainly can be encouraged by it.
While many nations are reaching for democracy, what are the policy choices
for changing the political economy? The overriding characteristic of the political
life and discourse of nations in the transition process is a frustrated desire to escape
the choice between a nationalist-populist project and a neoliberal project. The
rejection of these alternatives and dictatorship has a deeper meaning than is
traditionally understood. It is a revulsion against a feigned public life, which is in
fact little more than a weapon or disguise of private interests. The problem is not
unique to Haiti. It is reflected in the institutional structures of many developing
nations.1 17 The dominant regimes of the less-developed economies, and even their
critics, often start with the desire merely to imitate and import the institutional
arrangements of the rich industrial democracies. They do this in the hope that from
similar institutional devices, similar economic and political development will
result. But such imitation has not led to these desired results. The failure of these
efforts at emulation may nevertheless be useful to the development of new and
experimental institutional structures, which may shed light on the suppressed
opportunities for transformation. But Haiti and many of these nations have not yet
started on this path.
The import-substituting protectionist style of industrialization and the pseudoKeynesian public finance of a national-populist approach are unable to deal
effectively with the huge problems facing these nations. Latin America, for
example, still faces the problems caused by past periods of hyperinflation and
stagnation created by irrationally closed economies and massive public spending." 8
Neoliberalism (neoliberalismo), the single-minded pursuit of foreign investment
and its accompanying austerity and inequality, is unable to service the real
conditions of sustained economic growth.
Neoliberalism's rise to the status of religious doctrine is largely due to the
influence of the United States, particularly in regulating and controlling the conduct
of international monetary and trade organizations. The Reagan Administration
117.
This notion is reflected in Latin American nations where a very small group of very rich
people control the government. See, e.g., Latin America in Deep Recession-South America Suffering
from Succession ofEconomic Shocks, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 22, 1990, at B6.
Argentina and Brazil are prime examples.
118.
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pushed the Latin Americans into pro-business austerity programs and set the tone
for a worldwide reduction of government rule. Neoliberalism's acceptance is also
due to the policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and to
the wealth of its corporative backers in a region where money matters above all
else in politics. Nevertheless, globalization has not had the desired consequences.
What is clearly needed now is to somehow fix neoliberalism's major flawchiefly that it does not help the poor, vast majority live a dignified life. Instead,
corporative power creates wealth for a small minority, while almost enslaving the
majority. If democracy seeking governments do not spread the benefits of
globalization, countries such as Haiti will remain divided between a very small
group of ultrarich economic elite and a very large group of desperately poor and
marginalized people.
Unlike neoliberalism's claim that government should play a minor role in the
economy, real democratic change requires government to play an important and
dynamic role. At a minimum, the international community must encourage these
governments to pursue locally designed policies to draw the poor into the global
economy. To achieve this minimal goal, these governments must be given
incentives to pursue a vision of a political economy that is quite different than the
image traditionally suggested.
In political economy terms, promising alternatives which will allow a
flowering of democracy might develop in a seriously underdeveloped nation such
as Haiti in a variety of rather experimental directions. Each of these experiments, of
course, must be continuously monitored so they can be changed as they unfold to
meet the requisite goals of democratization. This method is one of the few ways
that a positive transformation may take place in Haiti. Flexibility is a key to
success.
Moreover, what we may be able to say and do about the future possibilities of
democratization depends crucially on our interpretation of contemporary political,
social, and economic history. The radical change many of these nations are making
from inward oriented statist growth is still in full swing. Macroeconomic policy
makers still wrestle with price instability and proper exchange rate regimes.
External threats and internal mistakes only prolong the transition and generate
uncertainties that exacerbate the problems. Simultaneously, microeconomic
changes, technical leaps and innovations, the legal evolution of firms, and the use
and disbursement of property rights are still more in flux than fixed on the eve of
new cycles of growth or retraction.
At first blush, it may appear that Haiti's relationship to the world economy
leaves it with relatively few options. But I believe that options do exist. Although
we understand large-scale transitions imperfectly, what we do know is that
decisions made while institutions and partnerships are being created and forged
have significant-indeed enormous-subsequent effects. Thus the conjuncture of
deep structural transformation means that what these nations do now will shape
what they can do later. It is not just the structures, but also the rules that will shape
them, that are changing.
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Three major areas of concern are evident in the social, political, and economic
spheres. The first involves money. Macroeconomic instability is a major force in
undermining the ability of people, rich and poor alike, to save and invest for the
long term view. International sources may help, but without local savings or
investment, they often leave these nations exposed to forces over which they have
the least control.
The second area of concern is the legal structure girding ownership and use of
property rights. Reform of corporate law and the emergence of a new regulatory
regime (paradigm) may help private parties to seize upon new property rights to
create new enterprises and new industries. In both of these areas, the liberalization
of the market is the factor that should give the single biggest boost to long-term
growth. Increasing growth, however, is not the same as sustaining it. In both of
these areas, rule making and enforcement will certainly become the cornerstones
for growth.
The third concern is the approach to human capital. Both the long-term view
and long-term progress will be shaped by human skills and aptitudes. In Latin
American and Haiti, for example, the educational systems are impoverished. Good,
sound education is scarce and increasingly hard to find. It is, therefore, expensive
and unequally distributed. If it is true, as many claim, that education yields
increasing returns, this is clearly a matter of urgency for these nations.
These three areas of concern do not necessarily add up to an indictment of the
state in Haiti. Rather, they are best seen as an injunction that the state performs its
role as a state, with public duties and public authority. Indeed, there are public
goods-sound currency, security, the rule of law, and education-for which the
state has an overwhelming, indeed incomparable comparative advantage. Longterm growth in this region may well depend on governments' abilities to appreciate
and exploit their own mandates and resources. An active state is essential to the
success of such democratic reforms.
If governments are to play this major role, what steps can they take? First, as I
have already suggested, it is important that Haiti and these other nations take
macroeconomic stabilization very seriously. One way of doing this is through a
dramatic rise in and focusing of the tax rate which would impose upon the
privileged classes and regions of these nations the costs of public investment in
people and in infrastructure. It would be utterly unrealistic for these nations to
take another approach and conceive of a sound financial system as one based on
a drastic lowering of governmental expenditure rather than on a raising and
rationalization of taxes. There needs to be a strong preference for a universal,
direct consumption-based tax-taxing, in a steeply progressive way, the
difference between income and savings-as the means to finance the state while
promoting capital formation and productive investment. Countries like Argentina
and Haiti will need large amounts of international aid for a long period to
augment these taxings, because these nations are often in financial crisis. But this
aid must not be based on the same schemes that have harmed their economies and
helped lead these nations into their present predicaments.
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Second, there must be a push to train the poor majority in a variety of skills
needed in the global economy. Simultaneously, the state must help create the
conditions for an "anti-dualist" political economy. These democratically minded
governments have to aggressively attack and overcome the internal division of
these nations into two (or more) economies that are only tentatively and
hierarchically connected. What is needed is the consolidation and development of a
technologically skilled group of people-a vanguard-in both the public and
private sectors, and the use of this group to lift up and transform the immense,
backward second economy. This approach would also suggest attempting joint
public-private ownership of enterprises and encouraging decentralized capital
allocation and management. These two or more economies cannot be allowed to
become the platform for an antiquated fordist-style industry that is unable to
compete abroad except through internal wage repression and that is incapable of
transforming the second economy. For example, networks of small and mediumsized enterprises represent the most dynamic forces in many of the economies of
the developing nations and are even paralleled by external experiments in the large
businesses with the greatest potential for growth and innovation. These intimations
of an alternative, less conforming industrial future-changing the organization of
firms, perhaps by making them more democratic, as well as the character of
regional economies within the country-need to be developed by a deliberate
economic program, sometimes with the determined help of the international
community. Indeed, the international community must play a central role in this
experiment through monetary and technical assistance, including training people in
highly technical skills.
Third, if the breakdown of corporative control of the economy is to succeed,
the strict requirements of capitalism must be imposed on the so-called free market
capitalists through the privatization of the private sector. Because market forces
tend to concentrate wealth and power, a democratically minded government must
ensure that no barriers exist to participation in the market. Indeed, the more players
in the market, the less concentration of wealth and power. Otherwise, there is the
omnipresent risk of the dominant player whose power may skew the debate or the
policy toward his own self-serving ends, which may not be democratically optimal
ones. Therefore, the government must control monopoly, encourage business
formation, and even compete to counteract the power of the dominant big-business
actors. In addition, the activist state must protect local businesses from the
overwhelming power of international influences. Local voices remain unheard
when powerful external forces control the media, the economy or the political
sphere.
There are, of course, many positive aspects to a private market. If the economy
is successfully privatized, this will mean real competition, real refusal of the
capitalization of profits through the socialization of losses, real antitrust, real
markets in corporate control, real constraints on nepotism and inheritance, and real
private responsibility for the costs of public investment necessary to meet some of
these goals. Such a capitalist regime requires parliament to pass laws, and the
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executive and the courts to enforce them, opening the market so everyone can
compete on a somewhat level playing field.
These governments must also develop a parallel set of institutions to compete
in the marketplace. Public companies should be created and developed to compete
with the private ones. Moreover, these governments must impose on these public
companies the requirements of serious and decisive competition and independent
financial responsibility. Total privatization of publicly owned companies is not
necessarily a good idea.
The last part of the plan is educational. There must be a massive investment in
people and infrastructure, financed by taxes on the people with the goods-those
who possess the wealth. There must be a priority of such claims on the budget,
backed by procedural devices with executory force. In addition, preventive public
health, sanitation, and food supplementation need to be given preference over
therapeutic medicine. Even more important for democratic change is the fact that
the people must be educated. Free public schools must be open to everyone, and
literacy programs created and developed. 119 There must also be a shift of the
control of education away from the memorization of facts and towards an emphasis
upon the mastery of generic practical and conceptual capabilities.
In the organization of government, politics and civil society, the alternative to
nationalist-populist or neoliberalist projects may take the form of a public-law
counterpart to the political economy I have just outlined, animated by the same
concerns and moving toward the same goals. Experiments should be attempted in
these areas as well. For example, structural reforms require at least two sets of
institutional innovations. First, a merger of the electoral characteristics of
presidential regimes is needed, posing a periodic threat to oligarchic control of
political power. There must be a facility for rapid resolution of impasse through
priority accorded to programmatic legislation, liberal resort to plebiscites and
referenda, and perhaps the vesting of power in both the legislative and executive
branches of government to provoke anticipated elections in the face of impasses
over the direction any particular country should take. Second, measures must be
taken to heighten the level and to broaden the scope of political mobilization in
society, especially through the strengthening of the political parties, public
financing of political campaigns, increased free access to television and radio, and
the breakup of any broadcasting cartel. Direct democracy must be encouraged at all
levels of society. Certainly the internet must become a useful device for democratic
change.
The macropolitics of institutional change must be complemented by a
micropolitics confronting the logic of habitual social interactions. The typical
elements of this logic include a predominance of patron-client relations, with their
pervasive mingling in the same associations and encounters of exchange, power,

A plan to create a serious education system in Haiti has been proposed to the Interim Haiti
119.
Recovery Commission. But proposals and actions are, of course, two different things. See Editorial,
Haiti's Schools, NY TIMES, Aug 16, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/opi
nion/1 7tuel.html.
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and sentimental allegiance. There is frequently an oscillation between rule
formalism and personal favoritism, and each creates the opportunity and need for
the other. There is also a stark contrast between the treatment of "insiders" and
"outsiders," and the consequent shortage of impersonal respect and reliability.
A democratic system must be capable of challenging and changing both the
established arrangements of the economy and the polity, and the intimate habits of
sociability. In this task, those who yearn for democracy must combine a strategic
approach to the satisfaction of recognized material interests with the visionary
invocation of a reordered society. In nations striving for democracy that are trapped
in these impoverished visions and systems, nothing is more important than
encouraging the belief in the people that structural change is possible. The Haitian
government and the international community must encourage such beliefs and
actions.
Almost sixteen years after the deployment of the multinational force in 1994, it
is clear that Haiti's struggle for internal security and economic, social, and political
development-its attempt to become a democratic nation-will continue to be a
tortuous one. Unsettled political conditions, weak management of the economy,
public indifference to the electoral process, and grinding poverty underscore how
poorly the international intervention has succeeded in helping to create the
conditions for democracy. Some may, therefore, conclude that only Haitians can
overcome the legacy of their history. Even if one ultimately reaches this
conclusion, it is also correct to add that significant help from international
community is essential if Haitians are to achieve their goal. But only the correct
international incentives directed at the real problems will lead to a democracy in
countries like Haiti. So far, those incentives have simply not been properly
employed.
VI. A CONSTITUTIONAL

ADJUDICATIVE TRADITION

The requirements of constitutionalism suggest another crucial point in the
creation and development of constitutional democracies-the importance of a
constitutional adjudicative tradition. In the United States, for example, the
establishment of a constitutional adjudicative tradition and certain forms of
remedies, such as structurally transforming injunctive remedies, have aided in the
process of protecting human rights by establishing methods of rational discourse
that have helped to develop a moral consciousness in the citizenry. This tradition,
exemplified by Brown v. Boardof Educationl2o and its progeny, and the decisions
interpreting the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,121 has led to the protection of
human rights.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
120.
Although cases such as Brown v. Board of Education (banning racial segregation in public
121.
schools), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (recognizing the principle of one person-one vote), are
often viewed as the most significant modem decisions, and although they were certainly great steps
forward for the nation and the Constitution, I believe that the decisions incorporating the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights were even more significant. These decisions bind the states to almost all of the
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Many Latin American and other nations striving for constitutional democracies
have failed to develop this type of constitutional adjudicative tradition. Although
fragile, such a process can be useful to developing democracies. My thesis is that
the process of constitutional adjudication has been significant in the United States
precisely because it establishes a tradition that ultimately protects individuals
against the arbitrary actions of government. This tradition, by helping to create a
moral consciousness in the citizenry through the process of rational discourse, has
acted as a barrier against abuses by the government.
At the same time, however, a caveat is in order. The constitutional adjudicative
tradition is not a magic elixir that will cure all the diseases of any society
attempting to consolidate a democracy. It may be that such a tradition is not wholly
sufficient to protect these rights even in a developed democracy. In the United
States, for example, it is also true that the tradition has not always been faithful to
the promise of developing and perpetuating a moral consciousness in the citizenry.
Indeed, since the early 1970s, the Rehnquist-led Court, and now the Roberts-led
Court, have interpreted Bill of Rights' guarantees in a manner calculated to restrict
their scope severely. The Bush Administration attempted to dilute these precious
rights even further.' 22 I believe that it is not the necessary outcome of such a
tradition, but the failure to adhere to its stringent demands, that has led to an
erosion and derogation of the very human rights that are meant to be celebrated.
Furthermore, the methods of adjudication established in the United States are
not necessarily transferable to developing democracies. Differences in cultures,
history, and the role of law in each specific nation shape and define the methods of
adjudication. Nevertheless, I believe that the establishment of a constitutional
adjudicative tradition in these nations making the transition to democracy will be
extraordinarily important in perpetuating respect for the rule of law and ultimately
will act as a barrier against deprivations of human rights.
It is, therefore, critically important for nations attempting to make the
transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule to consolidate the rule of law.
This is important not only to secure respect for fundamental rights and for the
observance of the democratic process, but also to achieve satisfactory levels of
economic and social development. It is also necessary-and obvious-that the
consolidation of the rule of law, with the consequent overcoming of "dumb

restraints of the Bill of Rights. The vehicle for this impressive development was the Fourteenth
Amendment. Simply put, it has served as the legal instrument of an egalitarian revolution-a revolution in
judicial legal method as well as in substance. The Supreme Court employed this amendment, as well as
the other Civil War amendments, to protect citizens from the employment of government authority that
violates our national conceptions of human dignity and liberty. The United States has been radically
transformed by the standards, promises, and power of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citizens of all states
are now no less citizens of the United States. Each person is entitled to due process and equal protection
of the laws from all levels of government, state as well as federal. For an elaboration of this theme see
Irwin P. Stotzky, Federalism, Judicial Review, and the Protection of Individual Rights (Aug. 5, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
122.
See IRWIN P. STOTZKY, LAW AS JUSTICE:
SCHOLARSHIP (2009).
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anomie," requires strengthening the independence, reliability, and efficiency of the
judicial process.
To do this, nations must satisfy the guarantees which derive from the idea of
due process of law. These guarantees are concerned with the way in which an act of
State coercion-which because of its very nature infringes upon an individual right
and thus must be specially justified-may be exerted against a particular
individual. The general principle in a liberal democracy is that when a government
act coercively deprives an individual of a vital good, as many independent powers
of the state as possible should intervene to ensure that such an act is truly necessary
for the good of society. The legislative branch of government necessarily
intervenes in regulating constitutional rights. It draws a balance between
constitutional rights and determines the conditions under which some of them may
be limited for the sake of others. While the necessary generality of this legislation
guarantees some degree of impartiality, it is clear that the power may be arbitrarily
applied. Thus, the power of the state to perpetrate an act of coercion against an
individual must necessarily be mediated by an independent judicial power. Indeed,
the ideal of a liberal democracy is that a judge should always intervene between an
individual and an act of state coercion.
As many commentators argue,1 23 there are two main justifications for
interposing a measure of due process between the coercive deprivation of a good
and the individual who is the victim of it. The first is an intrinsic value resulting
from the fact that the individual in question is not merely an object to be
manipulated, but rather is part of a dialogue in which the prosecution tries to
convince him of the rightness of the coercion, as part of a cooperative search for
truth. The second justification ascribes to due process an instrumental value; it is
viewed as a mechanism for the impartial application of laws. Both justifications, of
course, complement each other. To have a dialogue in which the person affected is
an active part of the power process is the best way of achieving impartial
applications of the law.
The general guarantee of due process of law implies a series of other
guarantees; for example, those due process guarantees associated with access to the
jurisdiction of courts. Thus, there must be guarantees related to the conditions for
standing, the availability of appropriate remedies, such as habeas corpus and
injunctions, which protect basic rights, the guarantee against being tried in
absentia, the possibility of appeals, the availability of legal assistance, the
proximity of courts, the openness of the judicial procedure, and the efficiency and
expedience of that procedure.
Other crucial due process guarantees are those related to the characteristics that
the judicial process must satisfy, which include: (a) the observance of the
democratically enacted laws; (b) the unrestricted search for the truth about the
facts; and (c) the impartiality of the judge between the parties involved in the
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed. 1988); see
123.
generally Irwin P. Stotzky & Alan C. Swan, Due Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange
Treaties: Confronting an Uncertain Calculus,62 MINN. L. REv. 733 (1978).
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process. Additional implied guarantees include those due process guarantees
associated with the conditions that state coercion must fulfill, such as not imposing
cruel or inhumane punishment, being rational in enforcing the purpose of social
protection that the law was passed to meet, allowing the individual the possibility
of avoiding prosecution and punishment if he complies with the legal requirement
(an idea which rejects retroactive and vague legislation), and not punishing an
individual for the commission of involuntary acts.
In many nations which have attempted to make the transition to democracy,
the ideal of due process of law has not been actively enforced. Indeed, respect for
the guarantees of due process has often suffered from considerable oscillations and
from a combination of progressive constitutional and legislative acts and judicial
decisions that intentionally disregard those guarantees. This has occurred despite
the fact that such guarantees are recognized in most of the constitutions of these
nations.124
Moreover, although it is clear that the guarantees in the constitutions of these
nations do not explicitly include many of the necessary remedial devices, such as
habeas corpus and injunctions, which allow access to the administration of justice,
it is obvious that without proper remedial devices the rights become meaningless.
To put it another way, the existence of efficacious remedies inheres in the very
rights guaranteed in a liberal democracy. In spite of this recognition, many of these
nations do not have remedies sufficient to protect guaranteed rights, or, if they do
have the necessary remedies, the authorities have been almost powerless to enforce
them.
Legal assistance is another guarantee that is sorely lacking in many of these
nations. For example, such assistance in many nations is quite costly, in part as a
result of the length of the judicial proceedings. Although, in some of these nations,
there are some mechanisms for free legal assistance-such as lawyers for poor and
incompetent people-the procedures for appointing lawyers to cases is extremely
inefficient. In addition, these lawyers defend relatively few cases, such as those
involving minors or the mentally incompetent. There are also mechanisms for legal
assistance organized by municipalities or lawyers associations, but these are
equally inefficient and insufficient. It is also true that courts are not generally
accessible to large segments of the population, both because of geographical
location and because their procedures are too cumbersome, expensive, and slow for
dealing with the kinds of controversies common to the large majority of the
population.
The judicial process itself raises grave concerns. In Argentina, for example,
there has historically been institutional instability because of the large degree of
dependence by the courts, particularly by the Supreme Court, on the political
process. The Argentine Supreme Court, as in many of these nations' supreme
courts, is unstable because it frequently reverses its own opinions and because its
justices are frequently replaced. Indeed, almost every new government has had a

124.

Examples, of course, include Argentina and Haiti.
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judiciary of their own choice. For example, during the military regimes, one of the
first acts was to assault the judicial power. The military leaders selected judges who
would legitimize the military's seizure of power. With the return of civilian
government, the opportunity to shape the judiciary came directly after the previous
military assault on it. Nevertheless, in some of the civilian governments,
particularly President Alfonsin's government, the judiciary maintained its
independence.
The due process guarantees which should be granted in the course of the
judicial process are further impaired in these nations because of many factors, such
as the extreme slowness of the proceedings, the secretness and exaggerated
ritualism in which they are conducted, the delegation of many judicial functions to
clerical employees, the ex-parte communications many judges engage in, and
simple corruption. All of these factors destroy the impartiality and expediency of
the administration of justice.
There are also problems in complying with the requirement of legality under
which coercion may be exerted by the State. The major problems about the
conditions that acts of coercion must satisfy have to do with the ways in which
government detains people and treats them from arrest through imprisonment. The
problem runs deeper. Large numbers of acts of torture and maltreatment on the part
of the police and paramilitary forces are still reported, though they have certainly
diminished since reestablishment of democracy. Prisons are crowded, unhealthy
and non-rehabilitative places. There have been several inmate uprisings in these
countries. Perhaps the most grievous situation is that of people held in detention
during the entire length of their trial, without any possibility of parole. They are in
almost the same conditions as convicts, and often the trial lasts so long that they
serve the entire sentence for a crime for which they may later be found not guilty.
Moreover, they are not allowed any compensation for this preventive detention.
Further, many judges tend to convict a detainee after he has been in prison for such
a long time. In their minds, a retroactive conviction legitimates the detainee's
imprisonment.
However depressing these factors appear to be, and however debilitating to the
strengthening of the rule of law and the consolidation of democracy, all is not lost.
There are signs of hope. For example, major progress in the procedural conditions
for the protection of human rights has been effected by the ratification of several
international agreements in some nations undergoing the transition to democracy,
such as the American Convention on Human Rights,' 25 , the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,' 26with the optional protocol, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.127 Unfortunately, Haiti has

125.
American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica"., Nov. 22 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
126.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Optimal Protocol to the AboveMentioned Covenant, Dec. 19 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
127.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
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not been in the forefront of nations which have ratified many of these international
agreements.
VII. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO HELP HAITI RECOVER FROM THE EARTHQUAKE AND
MOVE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

As the international community reaffirms its commitment to Haiti, it must
overcome the mistakes of the past. Accountability, transparency, empowerment,
and capacity building should guide all rebuilding efforts. Donor states should use a
rights-based approach, targeting aid to build the capacity of the Haitian government
to ensure the rights of its people. Donor states should act with full transparency and
accountability, making information about their plans and programs available to all,
and should work with the Haitian government to set up public monitoring and
reporting mechanisms. Donor states should coordinate their actions by setting up a
Multi-Donor Fund that includes Haitian civil society and community-based
organizations as voting members.
But how are these factors to be implemented in Haiti? I suggest the following
steps to meet these goals:
Donor states must conduct assistance with the goal of ensuring the government
of Haiti has the capacity to guarantee the human rights of all Haitians, including
economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. This
requires donors to work directly with the Government of Haiti to identify needs and
to develop, implement, and monitor programs to provide basic public services,
including education and public health, water, and sanitation services. They must
also provide, to the fullest possible extent, assistance in the form of budgetary
support to the Government of Haiti. In addition, all non-governmental
organizations operating in Haiti must be encouraged to coordinate with the
Government of Haiti and other agencies and report their activities to the
Government of Haiti, Multi-Donor Fund, and the Haitian public.
Donor states must coordinate all assistance through a Multi-Donor Fund. They
must include the Government of Haiti and representatives of Haitian civil society
and community-based organizations as voting members on the governing
committee of a Multi-Donor Fund. In addition, all assistance to Haiti must be
conducted in accordance with the International Aid Transparency Initiative and
Paris and Accra principles.' 28 Moreover, it would be very helpful to create a public
web-based database to report and track donor pledges, disbursed funds, recipients,
sector areas, and expected outcomes under the aegis of the Multi-Donor Fund. The
international community must also establish and fund a mechanism to deliver
information about assistance projects to the Haitian people, administered by the
Government of Haiti in partnership with civil society and community based groups.
The international community should build the capacity of the Haitian government
to budget, disburse funds, and implement projects in a transparent way.
128.
Int'l Aid Transparency Initiative, Accra Statement (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://www.aidtransparency.net/wp-content/w3tc/pgcache/-index.html.gzip.
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Any aid project has to ensure that assistance projects are Haitian-led and
community-based at every stage, recognizing the importance of including internally
displaced persons who may not be integrated into the community. These projects
should prioritize programs benefiting vulnerable groups, including women and
children, the disabled, the elderly, and internally displaced persons. In addition, the
United Nations sector clusters must include Haitian civil society and communitybased organizations. Where non-Haitian leadership is absolutely necessary, the
international community must ensure that Haitians are provided positions where
they can learn from project implementation and develop a national capacity to
perform those functions.
Finally, the international community and the Haitian government must ensure
assistance delivers concrete results. To do this, they must establish and fund a
mechanism to measure and monitor the outcomes of assistance projects at the
community level. All findings should be made public. This mechanism should be
administered by the Government of Haiti in partnership with civil society and
community-based groups and should include a mechanism for Haitians to register
complaints about problems with implementation of projects.
The international community should request the United Nations, through the
office of the United Nations Special Envoy, to report publicly every six months on
disbursement of funds by project, progress on project implementation, and whether
aid has been delivered in a transparent, accountable, and participatory manner.
Finally, the international effort to help Haiti must ensure that all implementing
organizations, including the government of Haiti, United Nations agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and community-based organizations, comply with
principles of transparency, accountability, participation, and capacity-building by
using measurable indicators and by providing information on funds expended and
progress on project implementation.
Implementing these concepts requires a new vision for Haiti. And that vision
must come from the Haitian people. All citizens-particularly the historically
excluded majority-must be allowed a voice in how to organize and develop the
nation. These people surely know how to organize social movements. They must be
given a voice, for example, in how to educate their children, raise crops, and build
homes. They must be the force behind and in front of the reconstruction effort.1 29
VIII. CONCLUSION

On April 15, 2010, Haiti's Parliament approved the creation of a commission
co-chaired by former President Bill Clinton to oversee billions in post-earthquake

129.
Camp residents, for example, have managed a small scale model of a future society that they
believe should be created. "This includes democratic participation by community members; autonomy
from foreign authority; a focus on meeting the needs of all; dignified living conditions; respect for
rights; creativity; and a commitment to gender equality." Beverly Bell, HaitianRefugee Camps Model
Future Society, REVISTA AMAUTA, (Aug. 27, 2010), http://revista-amauta.org/2010/08/haitian-refugeecamps-model-future-society/.
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reconstruction aid.130 The measure has been approved by the parliament and by
President Rend Prdval.13 ' The vote extends Haiti's earthquake state of emergency
for eighteen months, leaving the billions of dollar delivered in that time to be
overseen by the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, led by Clinton, who is also
the United Nations special envoy to Haiti, and Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive.
The international donors demanded the vote because they want a high degree of
foreign control over an estimated $5.3 billion pledged for 2010-2011 at a March
31, 2010 United Nations Conference. President Pr6val will have veto power over
the commission decision. He will almost certainly not use that power because he
cannot afford to have the funds cut off. Indeed, the reconstruction panel includes
representatives who pledged at least $100 million in cash or $200 million of debt
relief and includes the United States, Venezuela, Brazil, Canada, the European
Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank.
In addition to the aid problem, Haiti faces an election problem. The legislature
has dissolved after the members' terms expired in May, 2010, because the
earthquake forced the cancellation of February's legislative election. Pr6val's fiveyear term ends in February, 2011. An attempt to prolong his term by several
months if elections are not held resulted in protestors clashing with police in front
of the ruins of the National Palace. Failing to hold the November, 2010, election
on time, even despite the losses of the electoral commission headquarters and
records, would certainly hurt Haiti's fragile democracy. After much bickering,
however, on June 27, 2010, President Pr6val issued three presidential decrees to
resolve this crisis.1 32 Two of the decrees designated November 28, 2010 as the
official date for Haiti's presidential and postponed legislative elections. The third
decree mandated Haiti's nine-member Provisional Electoral Council to plan for
presidential elections.133
But Haiti has made almost no progress in rebuilding since the earthquake. The
picture is grim. Millions are displaced from their homes, and rubble and collapsed
buildings dominate the landscape. The Haitian camps are congested beyond
imagination, with dilapidated tents standing edge to edge in every square foot of
Progress, INTERIM HAITI RECOVERY COMM'N, http://www.cirh.ht/index.jsp?sid=1&id=2
130.
7&pid=27 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010); Jonathan M. Katz, Haiti Lawmakers OK Clinton-Led Rebuilding
Panel, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 16, 2010..
INTERIM HAITI RECOVERY COMM'N, supra note 130.
131.
Jacqueline Charles, Haiti's President Picks Date for Elections, MIAMI HERALD, June 27,
132.
2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/27/1703022/haitis-president-picks-date-for.html; Jonathan
M. Katz, US Senate Report Says Haiti Rebuilding Has Stalled, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2010.
Another serious problem is the exclusion of the majority party. Democratic members of the United
States Congress are concerned that Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council has excluded candidates from
political parties which are loyal to the exiled former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, including the
country's largest-Fanmi Lavalas. See Lawmakers Urge Clinton to Ensure Haiti Elections are
Inclusive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/world/americas/09haiti.html.
Unfortunately, as of August 28, 2010, allegations have already been made that the "domestic
133.
political elite is manipulating the country's election commission to freeze out strong challengers."
Fifteen presidential candidates were disqualified by the Commission of Electoral Observation without
explanation. Alice Speri, Wyclef Jean's Disqualification Signals Haiti Diaspora Not Welcome in
Politics, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 25, 2010, 4:39 PM EDT), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/A
mericas/2010/0825/Wyclef-Jean-s-disqualification-signals-Haiti-diaspora-not-welcome-in-politics.
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available space. With the rainy season beginning, and with tropical rains lashing
the capital daily, the reconstruction has simply not started. Indeed, the crowded
conditions and overtaxed public toilets raise real concerns about a worsening
cholera epidemic. Construction is being held up by land disputes and customs
delays while plans for moving people out of the tent-and-tarp settlements remain in
"early draft form." It is, of course, to be expected that cleaning up the rubble will
take time. But what is demoralizing is that it has not really started.
Indeed, as this article goes to press, more than a year after the earthquake,
Haiti's streets are still lined with piles of rubble.' 34 Government officials and aid
workers claim that rebuilding efforts are impeded by "a lack of available land and a
complex ownership situation confused by multiple property claims and an absence
of reliable land records."' 3 5 Only modest efforts have been made by organizations
to begin rubble removal operations and therefore calls have been made to place the
issue into the forefront of national debate.' 3 6 These organizations desperately need
help, but apparently rubble removal is not "sexy" enough to gain a response from
donor nations.13 7
Haiti continues its destructive approach. After an initial honeymoon period
with the international community, the Haitian government has lapsed into its
classic pattern of corruption, inefficiency and delay that holds the country hostage.
The Haitian government has imposed stringent controls which have hurt the effort
to clean up the incredible mess caused by the earthquake. For example, at a recent
United Nations-led meeting, one international organization reported that it had
forty-five vehicles waiting at Haiti's border with the Dominican Republic.' 38 They
had been there several weeks because the Haitian officials had denied them entry.
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case. Dozens of organizations involved in the
relief effort have had trouble importing goods and materials. The restrictions and
requirements put on new projects to help the Haitian people continue to grow.
With over 600 organizations present in Haiti, central planning is essential. But the
Haitian government is simply not up to the task.
Moreover, the classic divide between the economic elite and everyone else
continues to grow. As ordinary Haitians suffer, the elite continue to live in luxury
in elegant homes situated above Port-au-Prince. As they have historically, they are
profiting from the country's latest tragedy. Haiti's elite control access to rental
cars, trucks, housing, offices, warehouses, and local supplies, and the aid agencies
must purchase those materials from them. The rich also have a huge stake in how
the reconstruction takes place. International efforts to aid the poorest Haitians also
make the rich even richer and increase the already harrowing gap between the
economic elite and everyone else.
Pascal Fletcher, Haiti Quake Homeless at Risk, Shelter Crisis Drags, REUTERS, Sept. 29,
134.
2010, availableat http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N29189981.htm.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
E. Thomas Johnson, Haitians Still Wait for Recovery, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/25/opinionfla-oe-johnson-haiti-20100625.
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Even with these incredible hurdles to overcome, however, the Haitian people
continue to confront these issues with courage and hope. My hope is that at least
some of the economic and social plans I suggest in this article will be implemented
and that they will lead to a movement from "misery to poverty with dignity" and
beyond for the present and future generations of Haitians.

